斯坦福哲学百科词条:直觉(作者:Joel Pust)

Pust, Joel, "Intuition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/intuition/.

本条目通过对下面五个问题进行回答,阐述了直觉的本质和直觉在认识论中的地位:

  1. 什么是直觉?
  2. 直觉在哲学理论(或者其他扶手椅式学问——指研究问题不通过实验进行)研究中的地位是什么?
  3. 直觉的地位是否符合实际,被高估还是被低看?
  4. 对这一地位的直觉进行经验性研究能够说明什么问题?(补充材料:思想实验的逻辑结构
  5. 思想实验给我们提供了怎样的直觉内容?

目录

1. 直觉的本质

考虑这个命题:一个完全理性的人不会既相信P又相信-P。很可能,你考虑这一命题的时候,它就已经对你来说是对的了。有些类似的命题和它一样,比如:

  • I1:非非P是P。
  • I2:为了快乐而虐待一只猫是错误的。
  • I3:正方形不可能有五条边。
  • I4:将大脑移植进新的身体后人能继续存活。

本条目的要点:纯粹以命题的形式来看,直觉的命题(心理状态或事件)看起来是真的。

显然,关于直觉的普通用法夹杂了许多这样的心理状态:家长可能直觉上认为自己的孩子不是罪犯,考古学家直觉上认为古迹一定会出现在某个区域。一些心理学家对直觉这一概念的使用同样夹杂了许多东西,使用范围是模糊的。近期有心理学者研究自然决策中的“直觉”(Klein 1998),它表明:在某个领域具有丰富经验的个体在做出决策时是基于认识理性的,而不会考虑意见、权衡证据和效用。例如新生儿护理、灭火、下象棋,专家能“直觉”(想法立即出现在意识中)到某些婴儿身上长疮,火会沿着某个线路燃烧,移动某颗棋子是好的选择。

除了明晰“直觉”在不同领域里的语言学用法外,我们关于“直觉”的理论是否能够正确回答目前世界上已经发现的相关的心理学与认识论问题也是重要的。本条目还说明“直觉”在哲学理论(或者其他扶手椅式学问)研究中的作用。从上面列举的I1到I4命题中,我们能够发现(或者提出合理假设):人们对直觉的兴趣已经构成了许多单独的认识论与心理学类型。更多的例子我们会在2.2节与2.3节中列举,这些关于直觉的新例子都不是上面段落中提到的类型(它们是另外的新的类型)。

1.1 直觉是信念

一些哲学家将直觉等同于信念,或者认为直觉是信念的某种类型。比如David Lewis写道:

和我们的哲学理论相似,简单的说,直觉是一些意见:一些是基于常识的,另一些是富有深刻洞见的;一些是特殊的,另一些是普遍的;一些是被更深的持有的,另一些则相反。但它们都是意见。(1983,px)

这样的观点提出了下面的说法:

  • A1:S有直觉P当且仅当S有信念P。

为什么我们要接受命题A1?也许理由是它符合本体论的简约性要求:如果直觉就是信念,我们就不需要设立更多新种类的心理状态。更进一步说,直觉与信念之间有着紧密的联系:一个人显然相信自己直觉到的东西。

然而,信念P对直觉P来说是没有这样的关系的,前者对后者既不充分也不必要,因为信念与直觉之间会发生冲突。也可以这样表达:P是一系列的命题,它们每个都是符合直觉的,但它们并非都是信念(因为它们并不一定是真的,所以不能构成信念)。如果我们能找到解决这个难题的办法,并且能够筛选出那些假的不能构成信念的命题,也依然可能持有一种直觉——那些被筛选出的命题是真的(可以构成信念)。再假设信念本身是没有矛盾的(集合中的任何信念都可以被持有),我们却仍然可以持有直觉P而没有信念P(对P的信念并不是直觉P的必要条件),或者我们有信念P而没有直觉P。因为,事实上,在进行这种推断之前,我们就可能否认包含矛盾的集合P是信念(不持有它),即使这个集合P仍然是符合直觉要求的。更进一步说,我们也许可以相信某些事——一些理论是对的、一些数学命题、逻辑命题是符合数学原理或相关逻辑的、某个人是饥饿的或者他正在说话,却直觉上并不这么看待这些事。所以,对P的信念并不是直觉P的充分条件。

上面的情况也说明了直觉的一个重要特征——它与信念是因果独立存在的。我们将直觉与感觉进行对比,就更容易明白这个特征。当我们看到缪勒·莱尔错觉(Müller-Lyer,指在两根等长线段的末端分别加上不同方向的箭头会导致感官认识错误)时,可能会在得到一条线段比另一条线段更长的感觉经验,即使我们已经反复测量了长度并确信它们一样长。每当这样的情况被哲学家举例的时候,道德直觉就可能被认为是:

道德幻觉类似于视觉上的错觉,它是不可以被消除的,因为即使我们有更好的道德理论能够消除它们,直觉上我们仍然认为这些道德幻觉存在(Kagan 1989,p15)。

这种说法的另外一个更简明的版本是认为直觉是病态的信念,这被许多心理学家和具有自然主义倾向的哲学家们所喜欢,他们把直觉看成是没有意识或没有包含内省推理的病态信念:

  • A2:S有直觉P,当且仅当S形成P的信念:并非有意识地从一些其他信念推断而出。

A2命题说明:有意识的、包含推理的信念不是直觉。然而A2仍然错误地包含了非推理的感知信念——记忆信念和内省的信念作为直觉。此外,另一个错误A2同A1一样:事实上一个人可以直觉到自己不相信的东西(没有信念)。前一个错误可以被规避(非推理性信念或由病态信念得到的进一步限制),后一个问题似乎不容易被规避。

这一命题的修正版本为(Ludwig 2007,p135):

  • A3:S有直觉P,当且仅当S形成的信念P基于与P符合的概念。

A3命题规避了A1、A2命题的错误:它不将内省、记忆或感知(感觉)的信念作为直觉。然而(理由有三),(第一:命题空洞)假设我们所讨论的概念不是矛盾的,A3命题可能意味着直觉是不可能的(无法被讨论的),因为这取决于与P符合的概念的要求是什么。(第二:存在反例)即使直觉是不可能的:S没有符合A3理论的直觉,但S仍然可能有直觉。(第三:循环论证)最后,A3包含了直接的内省判断:人们有难以证明的不能内省到自身无意识信念的原因的直觉。

1.2 直觉是信念倾向

Peter van Inwagen认为直觉是这样的:

在某些情况下,它使我们倾向于持有某些信念:使我们朝着接受某些命题的方向“移动”,而不是让我们接受这些命题(1997,p309)。

表明下列命题:

  • A4:S有直觉P,当且仅当S倾向于相信P。

如果倾向于相信是一种命题的态度,这样的解释说明:直觉是命题态度。不像上面那样认为直觉是信念的理论,这样的观点允许一个不持有此信念的人拥有关于它的直觉。然而,A4似乎过于宽松(把不是直觉的算成是直觉),没有对所讨论的倾向的性质或来源加以限制:一个人可能会倾向于相信一只狗在附近,如果他转头看见这只狗;或者倾向于相信某人是在痛苦中的,如果他对这个人进行思考的话;或者倾向于相信一个复杂的理论,如果有人对他进行适当解释的话。单独来看,这些被倾向于相信的事例,都不是直觉的充分条件(都不足以说明它们是直觉——有这种倾向不意味着有这种直觉)。另外,在处理某些倾向性的时候,A4命题暗含这样的观点:一个人相信P而不能解释自己为什么有关于P的直觉。

以上问题可以通过对A4进行限制来解决,一个新的更可信的观点认为(Sosa 1998):

  • A5:S有直觉P,当且仅当S倾向于相信P是因为理解P。

然而,许多人认为:只有当S出现相关的有意识的心理状态时,S才有一个直觉。如果是这样,任何纯粹的像上面这样的倾向论的观点都不能符合要求,因为这种方式并不说明直觉的有意识心理状态。可能在某个时刻,我们有大量的相信某件事的倾向却没有持有直觉。举例来说,一个人在某个时刻可能有直觉:朴素概括公理1是正确的。但这个人在交通拥挤中开车回家时就没有这样的直觉。然而,按照A5命题,一直以来她都是理解朴素概括公理的,也就是说她应该一直有直觉(Bealer 1998,p209)。同样的,我们直接通过内省就可以知道这样的知识:当一个人没有直接的关于自身倾向性的内省知识的时候,特别是没有激活自己的倾向性而仅仅因为理解而相信的时候,他有直觉P。(其他讨论参见 Pust 2000; Erlenbaugh 和 Molyneux 2009; Koksvik 2011)

1.3 直觉是特别的状态

最后一种解释认为:直觉是一种独特的动态性的命题态度,命题为真时的特征是经常变动的(Bealer 1998,2002; Pust 2000; Huemer 2001,2005):要么命题在展现给主体时是真的(Chudnoff 2011a),要么使得主体相信了这一命题(Koksvik 2011)。这些学者一致否认信念P是直觉P的充分条件或必要条件,并且拒绝承认直觉是倾向于相信,直觉P与倾向于相信P之间的紧密联系被解释为:直觉是倾向于相信命题P的基础。

在这种解释的持有者看来,我们有直觉P,却并不就是表现、相信或者考虑P。更确切的说,P是一个独特的变动的非信念(与信念无关)的命题态度。举例来说,Bealer就有这样的说法:

当你有一个直觉A,意味着A显现于你。这里所使用的“显现”术语并不能在简单的限定意义(静态且无意识区别:能够起到警示作用的防护标语或者措施)上进行理解,应该理解为一种意识发生的状态。举例来说,当你第一次考虑德摩根定律2时,它看起来既不是真的也不是假的。然而,你过段时间反思它时,可能会发生这样的事:它现在看来是真的了。(Bealer 1998,p207)

支持上面观点的其他哲学家也认为知觉(或其他)的经验有着命题性内容,并且,寻求对直觉、知觉或其他显像(seemings)和经验的独特特征进行解释。

依据这类学者对“显像”的用法,一个统一的关于直觉的理论解释应该是这样的:

  • A6:S有直觉P,当且仅当P显现于S。

虽然这个解释看起来符合大部分直觉的心理学研究结果,但它的区分度不够:如果命题内容中存在记忆或内省的内容,那么它们并不是本条目所提到的直觉。更进一步说,当感觉经验包含“P显现”的时候,这种解释(观点)暗示了这样的错误内容:存在感觉性直觉。即使这些东西是某种常识,我们也应该说明这些状态并非直觉。一个更加完善的解释是:

  • A7:S有直觉P,当且仅当P在智性上显现于S。

然而,有些学者认为哲学研究中的主要直觉应该与其他的包含智力活动的心灵状态区分开来,这很重要。比如Bealer就认为哲学研究依赖于“先验直觉”,这种直觉必须与科学家做思想实验时的“物理直觉”(physical intuitions)区分开,因为后者在哲学研究中并不必然表现出来(1998,p165)。这些不承认物理直觉与先验直觉一样包含同样的智性的人,对命题做出了进一步限定,以便说明这里的直觉是指具有独特哲学相关性的直觉:

  • A8:S有理性的直觉P,当前仅当P在智性上必然显现于S。
  • A9:S有理性的直觉P ,当且仅当:

[A](1)P在智性上显现于S,(2)如果S要考虑P是否必然为真,P在智性上必然显现于S;
或者[B]P在智性上必然显现于S。

A8认为理智直觉是种能力,是模态的(动态的,语境化的),在某一时刻t将概念c展现于思想中的能力。也就是说,理智直觉P是必然地、智性地呈现于S面前的,只有做到了这点,我们才能说S有理智直觉P。这种智性能力,需要一定程度的深思熟虑。虽然对哲学一无所知的人或许也会有一些理智直觉,但这种能力的显现不如深思熟虑的人明显(Pust 2000,p38; Ludwig 2007,p136)。此外,在智性上并非必然显现的直觉对哲学实践也是必要的,如果[A8]的支持者希望自己的直觉解释理论能够包含它在内(而不是将它们看作是由理性直觉推倒得出,认可必要性原则),那么他们也必须将这样的直觉视为模态命题。

(见Pust 2000,p46)A9要求理智直觉中包含单一的非静态的有意识地心理状态,并且把这种状态从物理直觉中区分开来,认为朴素的主体即使不能够实时的处理形而上学必要性的概念,他也可能有理智直觉。A9同样不要求并非必然显现的直觉里包含模态内容。然而,因为这一命题许多时候使用倾向性,而非直觉是否具有动态因素来区分理智直觉与物理直觉(或者其他的直觉),它可能产生一些问题,从而错误的认为:我们有能力直接辩别自己是否持有理智直觉。

一些哲学家认为上面这样的特殊的命题态度并不存在,或者它们并不是我们精神活动的一部分。比如,Williamson写道:

对于我自己来说,我不认为自己有自己所不知道的智性,以至于倾向于相信Gettier的命题……。如果这个短语意味着比Lewis或者Inwagen的说法更进步的话(这一命题没有用),那么这些范式也没有提供“智性上的显像”的证据(2007,p217)。

“智性上的显像”的支持者必须去解释其他理论的错误,然后使自己的想法得以实现。(见Chudnoff 2011a和Koksvik 2011,他们描述了这样的怀疑论者应该寻求什么。)

Williamson(2007,pp218-219)反对以上的直觉分类,指出各种各样的命题内都包含不是知觉或“反直觉”的东西,因此支持更宽容的观点:直觉是信念或信念倾向(直觉是倾向于相信)。在他看来,直觉的分类不应仅仅包括否定命题(对其进行更多的限制),Williamson举例指出,本节的观点意味着我们通常所思考的山不存在,这是高度反直觉的。然而,有的命题认为我们思考的东西存在,只不过那些东西在任何意义上都不是直觉的内容。

一个可能的反驳Williamson的办法是描述违反直觉的标准是什么:不足以充分的在形而上学上说明一座山存在的原因是由于没有合适的物质安排(no suitable arrangement of matter),并且,没有在更严格的意义上说明否定这个命题的理由。另一个反驳办法是指出:我们有非常好的理由相信有山存在,并且认为反对P是违反直觉的,因为非P是能够完全被证成的。

1.4 小结:命题、性质和功能

到目前为止,所有理论都认为,直觉的对象是命题。但,有些人可能不同意,他们认为我们的直觉是有性质或状态的。事实上,他们可能觉得我们应该对直觉内容进行重新的把握。想要重新把握,我们需要详细的说明命题、性质及其关系。当然还要详细说明“从言”命题态度和“从物”命题态度3。以上理论都没有对此进行说明。(None of these explorations can be undertaken here. )然而,应该指出的是,无论是在概念还是性质方面,我们所要重新掌握的这种概念的性质是潜藏在许多理性主义的解释或观点之下的(Bealer 1998; Bonjour 1998),并且更为确定的是:我们通过亲知(acquaintance)而掌握知识4(Russell 1912)。

此外,直觉的命题内容的概念可能必须随着情景而变化。例如,那些反对直觉是命题或直觉是倾向于相信的理论的人可能会认为:我们通过理性直觉相信的理由不是一个纯粹的罗素命题,而是一个弗雷格命题或一种亲知类型的罗素命题(弗雷格认为:语词只有在语境中才能获得意义)。

最后,上面的重点是将直觉作为心理状态或事件。有时直觉的问题是围绕着“是否有一个独特的直觉功能(faculty)”而展开的。当然,在某种程度上,直觉是可以解释的——有一些过程产生它们,有些人可能希望把这个过程称为“功能”(Of course, to the extent that intuitions are causally explicable, there is some process which produces them and some may wish to call that process a “faculty.”)。如果这是该术语的全部意思,不会产生任何问题。然而,虽然这样的说法可能有它正确的地方(特别各种认知科学尝试解释直觉的发生),但它的含义应该更多,比如不利于经验能力(empirical faculties)——视觉对直觉的证成,并包含断言性(错误)的观点(dismissive caricatures of the view):直觉是用来证成信念的。

2. 直觉的认识论地位

2.1 直觉在哲学和非哲学领域的使用

如第一节所述,本百科条目的重点是说明直觉在哲学中的作用。正是出于这种考虑,上面列举了这么多种解释,并分别多它们做出评估。因此,在下文中,我们将假设直觉是特殊的状态。不过,这样的假设对下面的大部分内容并不是必要的。

根据第一节的讨论,一些更宽松的对直觉的认识可能认为直觉具有复杂的内容。正因为这一点,我们值得关注许多哲学家的观点,这种观点认为:知觉经验基本上可以表征一个主题,远远超出现象学方法,命题描绘了深刻的属性(Siegel 2010)。根据这种观点,那些接受过适当培训的人可能有这样的感觉经验:一个孩子生病了、火很快会吞噬一个房间、红色(在这种情况下,非专家具有感知经验,火在他们面前呈现为红色的东西)。这种命题感知状态的认识论(如果存在的话)必须另外阐释。

2.2 思想实验

考虑下面的当代哲学推理案例,在这些案例中哲学理论因为与特殊的假想情况中的直觉相矛盾而被认为是不够好的(初步削弱):

  • 葛梯尔难题(Gettier 1963):

假设史密斯和琼斯申请了某项工作。史密斯认为,琼斯会得到这份工作(基于强有力的证据),并且琼斯的口袋里有十个硬币。史密斯因此推断得到这种工作需要口袋里有十个硬币。但是,想象一下,史密斯不知道得到这份工作的人是自己,而不是琼斯。另外,史密斯也不知道,他自己在口袋里也有十个硬币。

Gettier直觉:史密斯不知道得到这份工作的人口袋里有十个银币5

确证的真信念知识理论(Justified True Belief Theory of Knowledge):S知道P当且仅当S有一个确证的真信念P。

  • 器官移植难题(Thomson 1976):

假设你是一个负责器官移植的外科医生,现在你有五个需要进行器官移植的患者。为了避免可能的死亡,他们每个都需要被移植不同的器官。你的医院还有一名合适的器官捐献者正在接受检查。如果你不经过他的同意而将他的器官移植到另外五个人身上,他必然会死亡,但这种行为可以拯救五个人的生命(也使得另外五个人不会死亡)。

移植直觉:道德上不允许为了拯救五个人而牺牲一个人(拿走一个器官)。

行为功利主义道德理论:行动A在道德上是正确的,当且仅当这一行为最大限度地提高了幸福感。

  • 中国人的国家难题(Block 1978)

假设中国民众被团结的像一个大脑(团结一心),互相之间的沟通方式与个人的身心互动方式相似。

中国人的国家直觉:被如此组织的中国民众缺少自己的特性。比如,中国没有中国人民。

功能主义的心灵理论:S具有精神状态M,当且仅当S包含功能状态F的实现。

  • 旗杆难题(Bromberger 1966)

假设旗杆在明亮的阳光下被树立在水平地面上。根据相关的光学法则,从规范旗杆阴影的长度和太阳在天空的高度,可以推断出旗杆的高度。

旗杆直觉:旗杆的高度不能由其阴影的长度来说明。

演绎-名词化的解释理论:E能解释F当且仅当E是一组真理——它们演绎的说明F,并且演绎基本上依赖于名词的普遍化。

这样的思想实验有很多,比如说明个人同一性的心灵运输难题、认识论的千里眼和邪恶的魔鬼难题、决策论的纽康姆难题、自由意志的法兰克福难题、心理内容的孪生地球和沼泽人难题6,心灵哲学的黑白玛丽难题,应用伦理的电车难题,规范伦理的体验机。

在每个这样的思想实验中,我们将违背直觉的内容作为攻破理论的证据。同样,一个理论若是符合直觉,那么它的成立就获得了一部分的证据(通常是它成立的初步支持)。
(参见补充材料“思想实验的逻辑结构”,以进一步讨论这种推理的逻辑结构。)

如果我们考虑哲学方法论与自然科学方法之间的对比,直觉的使用方法可能更清楚。 一个经验科学家必须进行某种经验观察,以确认或否认自己的理论。如果说他的理论成立与否主要是通过实践来判断的话,那么相反,哲学家在很大程度上或完全地是坐在扶手椅上进行研究的。如果自然科学所采用的证据是由经验观察产生,那么在扶手椅上进行的哲学(或其他)研究也必须有一些其他(推定的)证据。一个自然的(虽然有争议的)观点认为,直觉是哲学研究的主要证据

注:使用特殊假设案例的方法进行方法论和认识论的讨论,当代一般称之为“思想实验”,这个名字的来历是其类比于经验科学中的思想实验。(Horowitz和Massey 1991; Sorenson 1992)。1.3节描述了这种类比不在此进一步追溯的原因。

附录:思想实验的逻辑结构

2.2节四个例子的逻辑结构很清楚: 首先,每一个理论或者解释都被置身于必要的双条件情景之中,然后,通过诉诸一个假设,说明尽管理论解释看起来是充分的,但实际上如果正在被分析的内容是不存在的(冲突是不存在的),那么该理论是正确的,如果正在被分析的内容存在(冲突存在),那么该理论有缺陷。

正如上面所说,通过直觉来证明理论的合理性与否是可以的。 然而,Williamson(2007)认为,与Gettier直觉相关,理论困难是在思考论证应该如何被形式化(普遍化)时揭示的。特别是,当思想实验的假设被描述时——人们可能想知道所谓的违反直觉的确切内容。毕竟,假设出来的情景并不是实际的。根据传统理性主义者的观点,直觉揭示了必要的真理,考虑这些问题中出现的反直觉内容是对理论必然性的要求:

  • K(x, p):x 知道 p。
  • JTB(x, p): x 有确证的真信念 p。
  • GC(x, p):在葛梯尔语境下,x 代表 p。
  • (1) ◊∃x∃p GC(x, p)
  • (2) □∀x∀p (GC(x, p) ⊃ (JTB(x, p) & ~K(x, p)))

因此,

  • (3)◊∃x∃p (JTB(x, p) & ~K(x, p))
  • (3) 违背JTB理论,解释为:□∀x∀p (JTB(x, p) = K(x, p))。

问题很明显,正如Williamson所指出的那样,(2)是假的,因为GC(x, p)是由于葛梯尔思想实验所描述的不完全性导致的,它可能以各种方式实例化的(它可能以其他的公式被描述出来)。这些可能被实例化的例子中,其中有命题不是知识却是正当的真信念的情况。例如,更多的x的存在破坏了x的信念的理由p,并且错误的声称S的信念是合理的。另一个涉及p的额外的独立证据或一些其他事实错误的使得S相信p不是知识。

Williamson 自己对这一错误的回应是将(2)变为一个反事实论断。产生了下面的结果:

  • (1) ◊∃x∃p GC(x, p)
  • (2c) ∃x∃p GC(x, p) ,反事实条件是:∀x∀p (GC(x, p) ⊃ (JTB(x, p) & ~K(x, p)))

因此,

  • (3) ◊∃x∃p (JTB(x, p) & ~K(x, p))

注:Williamson 认为 (2007, pp. 195–6) (2c)并不是自己所试图描述的普通语言里的形式化内容。在他看来“如果一个思想家站在葛梯尔命题的语境下,那么它就会对这个命题存在确证的信念却没有知识”。

这个论点的第二前提的说法被认为存在问题(Ichikawa和Jarvis 2009; Malmgren 2011)。首先,它的反事实特征是一个或然的真理,至少它的可确证性来自后天经验的理由。因此,典型的诉诸于直觉的哲学方法非常奇怪的产生了一个后天经验式的结果。第二,如果现实世界(或者最近的可能世界)包含了混乱的葛梯尔反直觉事故——主体知道p或缺乏相信p的理由,那么这一前提是假的 。如果是这样,那么葛梯尔反直觉事故并不是JTB理论的反例。第三,我们不能确定地排除这种混乱的实现。 因此,我们似乎没有明显的理由认为葛梯尔反直觉事故提供了JTB的反例。

第二种解决方案(Williamson 2007,第202页)将(2c)弱化至:

  • (2pc) ◊(∃x∃p GC(x, p) ,反事实条件是: ∀x∀p (GC(x, p) ⊃ (JTB(x, p) & ~K(x, p)))).

(2pc)将避免上面提到的关于(2c)的问题,并且Williamson允许S5将使我们能够从(1)和(2pc)推导出(3)。 不过,他拒绝这种重建,因为它不同于(1)和(2c)的论点,(a)S5的相关原则的正确性,和(b)将对这些原则的承诺归于从来没有考虑他们(the attribution of a commitment to such principles to people who have never considered them.)。

第三个解决方案,由Ichikawa和Jarvis(2009)提出,认为应该区分虚构故事的文本中明确陈述的内容和虚构故事中的真实内容。虽然Williamson担心虚构文本可以在别的情况中依旧凸显出来,虚构的真理没有明确的在虚构的文本中显示出来,这样一种情况可以消除这种担心。例如,它允许人们声称,在葛梯尔故事中(尽管在葛梯尔文本中没有明确说明),主体没有进一步的证据或知识,这将破坏自己的理由。将葛梯尔的事故中的命题集合命名为“SET”,一个人在遇到葛梯尔的文本时可以考虑命题g,在SET中的每个命题是真的。Ichikawa和Jarvis声称这是可能的,即使一个人没有在SET中提出每个命题,因为内容在某种程度上是说明性的,事情就是这样。然后(搁置虚构的专有名称的担心),葛梯尔推理可能形式化如下:

  • (1f) ◊g
  • (2f) □(g ⊃ ∃x∃p (JTB(x, p) & ~K(x, p)))

因此,

  • (3) ∃x∃p (JTB(x, p) & ~K(x, p))

这样解释的一个问题是:虚构的真理可能被在反事实词汇中分析 (Lewis 1978)。

没有翻译完,此节没看懂

2.3 普遍直觉

2.2节介绍了四个关于哲学理论的特殊思想实验。然而,这样的诉诸直觉的例子有很多,比如那些认识论的理性主义者所采用的那些。为了这样的目的,认识论的理性主义者认为有些命题的确证与否并不是依据感觉经验、内省和记忆的,而是理性直觉。(Bonjour 1998; Bealer 1998).

理性主义者的传统论证方式之一是诉诸这样的命题规则: (a) 我们看起来确证的相信,(b) 看起来不被经验确证,而是简单根据这些东西对我们的显像或理解而为真的。命题包括经典逻辑,基本算术,分析命题,颜色或形状排除原则和传递性主张的原则。举例来说有:

  • [R1] 没有东西可以既是红色又是绿色的。
  • [R2] 2 + 2 = 4
  • [R3] 如果A比B高,B比C高,那么A比C高。
  • [R4] 不存在圆的方。
  • [R5] (P 和 Q) 蕴含 Q.

思想实验推动了许多哲学理论的发展,比如认识论,道德理论,形而上学和心智哲学。理性主义的例子更加普遍化。

事实上,几乎所有的哲学重要命题都是以直觉为内容的,以下是一些被称为直观的命题的例子:

  • [G1] 如果S有证成的相信p,并且有证成的相信□(p ⊃ q),那么S有证成的相信q。
  • [G2] 如果X是一堆沙子,那么拿走一粒沙子后它仍然是一个沙堆。
  • [G3] S可以自由的进行动作A仅当S可以不这么做。
  • [G4] 对于每一个属性P,总有一个集合(即使是空集合)拥有P。
  • [G5] 通过给定的一个点,一定存在一个线段能够与给定的线段(不在给定点上)平行。
  • [G6] 后者y是否在数量上等同于前者x,这样的判断能否完全的建立在有关y与x和x与y的关系的直觉之上。
  • [G7] 任何两种在非道德方面相同的行动,必然在道德方面也相同。(Any two possible actions exactly alike in all non-moral respects must be exactly alike in all moral respects. )

2.4 直觉作为证据:直觉还是直觉命题被作为证据

前面章节旨在说明大部分哲学研究建立于直觉的基础上,要么将直觉作为证据,要么将直觉作为理由。然而,这种关于直觉的说法不够明确。将直觉P作为证据意味着:自觉本身被作为某种类型的证据,或者直觉命题的内容被作为证据。

将直觉内容作为证据既被分析哲学采纳 (Pust 2001),又被怀疑论哲学或者其他扶手椅式研究方式所采纳(Williamson 2007; Deutch 2010)。毕竟,如果一个理论的主要证据是心理上的,这似乎难以说明:为什么这样的状态或事件应视为并非心理学有关的理论的证据(比如知识的本性、道德的本性、属性的本性)。注:这种观点认为哲学家反而应该努力解释我们心理表现的结构或内容,参见Alvin Goldman最近的一些研究(Goldman 1999,2007)。此外,它看起来一点也不合理:最有名的哲学论证或分析是产生于心理学假设的,比如它们的前提是由人们的所寻找到的直觉提供的。然而,哲学家们却声称,这些心理学的东西是有关知识、道德和解释等内容的。

另一方面,没有解决这样一个事实:将直觉内容作为证据忽略了我们所明显确信或相信一个直觉命题的理由是什么。虽然我们在哲学中的大多数推理的证据包括非心理命题,但哲学要求与认识论相关的命题才能作为我们的证据。即使哲学论证中命题很少包括一个直觉性的前提,但我们在论证中接受前提的理由对于确定论证的最终解释力是非常重要的。

因此,直觉在哲学中被视为证据的观点被最好地认为是这样的:对于许多核心的哲学问题,我们相信答案的理由(至少基本上如此)在于我们是否有合适的直觉。它并不遵循所有明确的哲学推理可以正确地被表示为开始于命题,说明我们有各种各样的直觉(这样的论证是自败的,不能通过推理说明理由)。简单地说,观点是,直觉命题的发生被认为是给一个人提供了先验的理由确信自己的直觉。换句话说,这意味着:S有直觉P先验的确证了S有信念P。注:认识论的外部主义者拒绝非推理的论证,非推理的论证认为直觉是证据,或者认为基于直觉的信念(如果直觉与信仰不同的话)或直觉信念是知识,并将其作为自己观点的进一步证据)。

3. 问题与辩护

3.1 怀疑性论证的四个要求

直觉的怀疑者认为我们没有理由相信自己的直觉内容。说明怀疑论者的特征必须拥有的特征将使下面的论述更加简单,并且还有助于说明他们论证的共同特点和问题。

首先,这样的论证是关于直觉(普遍的直觉或一些特定类型的直觉)不能使我们确信其自身的。因此,任何这样的怀疑论证都必须有一个前提来说明信仰正当性的必要条件:称这个前提是“规范前提”

第二,这样的论证必须包含一个前提,说明基于所讨论的直觉信念不满足在规范前提中提出的合理信仰的必要条件: 称这个前提是“非规范的前提”

第三,一个好的关于直觉的选择性怀疑的论据必须是不同样适用于许多其他来源的推定的理性信念的论据。毕竟,如果争论的论点也论证对感知信念、记忆或自省信念的怀疑,它就没有显示出有关直觉的问题。将这个限制称之为“局部怀疑约束”

最后,(a)规范性和非规范性前提的正当性必须由某些证据或证据来源提供,而不是由论点所驳斥的直觉来提供;(b)我们必须缺乏足够的理由认为信念在规范或事实的前提下对规范前提提出了的合理信念的必要条件。这些要求结合起来称为“非自我破坏约束”(Bealer 1992; Pust 2001;Silva即将出版)。虽然违反这种约束并没有提供理由认为讨论中的论据不充分,但它确实是对一个怀疑论者的合理约束,这种论证意味着:确证的信念来自于确证的前提。考虑到要讨论的各种怀疑论点的支持者仅仅只是局部的怀疑论者(local skeptics),他们的论证肯定旨在推导出哲学上合理的信念(注:并非哲学理论的破坏者?)。

将直觉作为论证的反例的直觉怀疑论者将不在这里被讨论(Attempts to construe skeptical arguments against intuition as a reductio of the supposition that intuitions have evidential worth will not be discussed below)。但是,请注意,他们的支持者(a)需要为反例( reductio)所需的相关推理原则提供辩护的理由,(b)很可能被剥夺任何正当的积极的认识论立场,更不用说一个足以证明典型的直觉怀疑论者高认识论思维的实证研究(high epistemic regard for empirical inquiry.)。

3.2 无法校准论证

一些直觉的怀疑者认为直觉在认识论上是非法的,因为它不能被独立校准。在Cummins强有力的论证中,这种独立的校准要求得出“哲学直觉是认识论上毫无价值的理由”的结论(1998,第125页)。

论证如下:

无法独立校准的论证

  • [P1] 只有当人们相信证据的来源是可靠的时候,才有理由相信一个证据的内容。
  • [P2] 我们缺乏对直觉是可靠信念的独立理由。
  • [C] 我们没有理由相信直觉的内容。

虽然直觉与各种衍生的认识论来源,如科学仪器,有很大的似然性,但很显然,[P1]与局部的怀疑约束相冲突。这相当于原则上违反了论证要求。如果,如[P1]所述:直觉必须通过一些其他源头X来校准,则通过[P1],X本身必须由另一个证据源Y校准,证据Y本身必须被校准等。有些人认为,根据这一事实,不可能得出正当的信念,而有些人认为,在适当的情况下,可能这样做。如果前者是真的,那么[P1]与局部的怀疑约束相冲突。如果相反,后者为真,则[P1]为假。此外,很清楚,[P1]的论证将依赖认识论的直觉,因此违反非自我破坏的约束。

[P2]是什么意思? 不论证词的非还原性陈述,考虑到上面的关于论证的约束,所有哲学相关的直觉似乎都是不能独立校准的。主要原因在于直觉的内容与合适的由独立来源证明的信念之间并不等同,它们经常不是一个东西,不相关。似乎,我们不能使用感官来辨别某些情况是否为知识、行动是否正当、实体是否有意识、时间上不同的两个人是同一个人。同样,虽然知觉可能说明某些命题是否为真或者它的可能性,但它不能表明非实际真理的可能性或任何命题的必要性。

3.3 不可靠性论证

一个更可信的规范前提认为不可靠的(而不是不可校准的)能力不能证明信念的正当性,论证如下:

不可靠论证——初始版本

  • [P1] 人有确定的推理来源的证据的条件是:当且仅当这一证据是可靠的。(One is justified in believing on the (sole) basis of a putative source of evidence only if it is reliable.)
  • [P2] 直觉(或关于类型T的直觉)不可靠。
  • [C] (仅仅)基于直觉(或T型的直觉)的信念是不能被确证的。

鉴于规范前提旨在表达必要的真理,依据我们的经验和信念能被确证,即使它们被恶魔所欺骗,这是对可靠性的必要性的“新的邪恶恶魔”式的反例(Cohen 1984)。由于可靠性条件的自然解释在这里被违反,这被许多人采用以证明可靠性(这样理解)不是合理信念的必要条件。

然而,即使那些拒绝[P1]的人通常允许有理由认为推定的证据来源是不可靠的,这足以充分说明:任何先验的辩护(直觉另外提供的)是有问题的。 因此,我们可以重新表述如下的论证,以便为它提供一个更合理的规范前提:

不可靠论证——第二版本

  • [P1`] 人有确定的推理来源的证据的条件是:当且仅当他没有理由相信这一条件是不可靠的。
  • [P2`] 我们有(不败的:可以确证的)认为直觉(或T型的直觉)不可靠的原因。
  • [C] 因此,基于(仅仅)直觉(或T型直觉)的信念是不可以被确证的。

As the defense of [P1] or [P1`] requires appeal to epistemic intuitions, any attempt to justify by such means a skeptical conclusion regarding all intuitions, all epistemic intuitions or even all normative intuitions, would fail to observe the non-self-undermining constraint.

Still, it is worth considering the possible ways of attempting to justify skeptical arguments of a more limited sort by arguing that intuitions of some sort (which does not include epistemic intuitions or at least the epistemic intuitions of the sort needed to justify the premises) are unreliable. Given that the relevant non-normative premise must claim that intuitions of the sort at issue are more frequently false than true (or equally likely to be false as to be true) it seems to require an inductive justification based on a sufficiently large number of cases in which we have justification for believing ~p while p is the content of an intuition.

One way of developing the case would involve a sufficiently large number of cases in which one has an intuition-independent justification for thinking ~p while intuition testifies that p (intrapersonal intersource inconsistency). Another would involve a sufficiently large number of cases in which one has the intuition that p and either oneself or some other person has the intuition that ~p. In the intrapersonal case, this might involve our finding a given proposition intuitive and, at some other time, our finding its explicit negation intuitive (intrapersonal intrasource inconsistency). More likely is a less direct inconsistency, as when we have two intuitions which, though not the explicit propositional negations of each other, can be shown to contradict with the aid of some other justified principle. Many contemporary skeptics, however, wish to appeal to interpersonal disagreement as justification for their skepticism. Here we should distinguish between cases in which some other person has intuition-independent justification for believing the negation of the content of one of one's own intuitions (interpersonal intersource inconsistency) and cases in which the other person has an intuition with a content contradicting one's own intuition or, perhaps, fails to have any intuition regarding p (interpersonal intrasource inconsistency).

3.3.1 组间不一致

As noted when conceding the factual premise, [P2], of the Argument from Lack of Independent Calibration (§3.2), on the sui generis accounts of intuition (§1.3), there are few, if any, direct conflicts between the putative deliverances of rational intuition and our other sources of evidence (Bealer 1998; Bonjour 1998). Indirect conflicts would be ones in which the results of empirical theory contradict the content of rational intuitions. Such cases, if there are any, are quite rare.

Indeed, in view of the lack of direct conflicts, there is substantial reason to think indirect conflicts must be quite rare as standard empirical theorizing seems unlikely to yield conclusions about the domains about which intuition seems to inform us. These facts suggest that interpersonal interfaculty inconsistency will also be an insufficient basis for skepticism.

3.3.2 组内不一致

The main case of intrapersonal intrasource inconsistency has been mentioned previously—the case of paradoxes. To support the present (limited) skeptical argument, however, it must be parlayed into an argument that intuitions are so unreliable as to fail to justify belief at all.

It is not clear how this can be done. For one thing, there remains the fact that most of a person's intuitions are not in conflict with one another. For another, some conflicts between intuitions can be resolved by standard means or by favoring the more intuitive propositions. This is not to claim that such disagreements might not rationally require a suspension of judgment about the actual contradicting intuitions (if they are suitably balanced in strength). However, such a conclusion is quite limited and extends clearly only to areas of demonstrable and irresolvable inconsistency.

The case of greatest interest to skeptics is likely to be the case of interpersonal intrasource inconsistency or disagreement. We must be careful to distinguish between interpersonal conflicts of intuitions and conflicts between beliefs or between beliefs and intuitions. Philosophers disagree a great deal about the correct theory of free will, knowledge, justification and the like. This fact has been alleged to make a certain sort of epistemic modesty (though not complete skepticism) about the theoretical accomplishments of philosophy quite reasonable (Christensen 2007). However, philosophers seem to disagree less about what the relevant intuitions are. Bealer claims that

the on-balance agreement among our elementary concrete-case intuitions is one of the most impressive general facts about human cognition. (1998, p. 214)

(See, however, “the variation project” of experimental philosophers discussed in §4.1.) Functionalists, for example, don't usually claim to lack the intuition that the Chinese nation (Block 1978) would lack qualia. Rather, they often go to great lengths to explain away such intuitions, formulate the functionalist theory to accommodate them (Putnam 1967), or selectively deflate their epistemic value. Reliabilists don't typically claim that there is no new evil demon problem (Cohen 1984). Rather, they engage in considerable maneuvering to discount the intuition, to rephrase it in a way not damaging to straightforward reliabilism, or, most commonly, to provide an alternative, recognizably reliabilist, theory which accommodates the intuition.

Much of the recent literature on the epistemic significance of disagreement is focused on cases in which two persons disagree with respect to a single proposition which is inferentially justified, and in which the two parties are known to each other to have the same evidence and general cognitive virtues (Christensen 2009). The lessons of such cases for the present questions are likely to be limited. If intuitions are evidence which non-inferentially justify belief, then even if one ought to suspend judgment in the aforementioned kind of case, it will not follow that one ought to do so in the case of intuitive disagreements. Hence, we must instead focus on cases of disagreement between non-inferentially justified beliefs or, more appropriately, on the propositional content of some non-doxastic basis for such belief. Feldman (2007) provides a perceptual case (explicitly compared to something like rational intuition) in which one person seems to see p and the other, similarly situated, does not seem to see p. When the two become apprised of each other's appearances (and know each other to have equally good vision and to be honest), Feldman avers that they must withhold judgment on p. Perhaps the same is true with respect to philosophical intuitions.

However, it can be difficult to determine if another's failure to have an intuition that p is epistemically significant, as they may have yet to really grasp or consider the precise proposition at issue. An analogous claim is true in the perceptual case as well, as when one sees an object which is well camouflaged and another claims not to see it. Still, restricting ourselves to a situation in which one has good reason to think the other fully understands the content at issue and claims either not to have the intuition or to have the contrary intuition, we must ask what the appropriate responses to such cases is. Here, it does seem that the proper response is sometimes (depending on the proposition at issue) suspension of belief or some suitable diminution of credence (Bonjour 1998, pp. 138–142). Even if the correct response to disagreement about p in such cases is the suspension of belief (or a reduction of credence), it won't follow that beliefs in propositions about which no known disagreement exists are undermined. Nor could it follow that one must always have independent reason to think there is no disagreement prior to being justified in accepting the content of an intuition. That would be impossible.

A serious case for disagreement-based local skepticism regarding some entire class of intuitions which evades the non-self-undermining constraint would require justification for thinking that quite substantial disagreement with some equally (or more) competent other person has arisen. It cannot be supposed that the question of whether one is justified in thinking that some apparent competent interlocutor is sincerely testifying that p is entirely independent of the content of their apparent assertion or of one's total evidence relevant to existence of other minds and their mental contents of the appropriate sort. Some sorts of apparent disagreement call into question the understanding, sanity, intelligence or sincerity of one's interlocutor, as when some other denies some basic truth of arithmetic. Consider a version of Feldman's perceptual case in which there are successive occasions on which one seems to see p and one's interlocutor apparently denies that they see any such thing. Were they to become frequent enough, there might be reason to doubt that the other is honest and competent, speaking one's language, or, indeed, whether there is another person to whom one is speaking. Similar obstacles arise for the possibility of very widespread disagreement of intuitions, especially on views according to which the reliability of intuitions is constitutive of possessing certain concepts (Bealer 1998; Huemer 2005; Ludwig 2007).

3.4 解释性论证

许多直觉怀疑论者并不诉诸上面的不可靠性论证,而是采用了解释性论证。这些论证认为:(a)最好的解释直觉发生的方法并不诉诸于它们内容的真假(我们能不能确证的接受它们);或者(b)我们不能提供直觉如何显示于我们的证据前者称之为“缺乏解释的必要性”论证,后者称之为“可靠性是不可能的”论证。

3.4.1 缺乏解释的必要性

Gilbert Harman (1977) suggests that moral theories are unjustified because they cannot be tested and confirmed in the way that scientific theories can. While he admits that we may “test” general moral principles against our intuitions regarding particular actual and hypothetical situations, he argues that we are not thereby testing our moral theories or principles against the world. Instead, we are merely testing them against our “moral sensibility” or against our tacitly held moral views.

Harman claims that there is an important difference between the use of observations in empirical science and the use of intuitions in moral inquiry, a difference which renders moral intuitions unable to provide evidence for moral theory. The alleged difference is that

you need to make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the occurrence of the observations that support a scientific theory, but you do not seem to need to make assumptions about any moral facts to explain the occurrence

of the moral intuitions. When, for example, one has the intuition, in the Transplant case, that it would be wrong for a doctor to kill an unconsenting healthy patient to save the lives of five other patients,

an assumption about moral facts would seem to be totally irrelevant to the explanation of your making the judgment you make

and hence the intuition “does not seem … to be … evidence for or against any moral theory” (1977, pp. 6–7). The argument seems to be:

The Argument from Lack of Explanatory Necessity

  • [P1] Aside from propositions describing the occurrence of her introspectively accessible states, S is justified in believing only those propositions which are part of the best explanation of the occurrence of those introspectively accessible states.
  • [P2] Moral propositions are not part of the best explanation of the occurrence of S's introspectively accessible states.
  • [C] S is not justified in believing moral propositions.

The normative premise, [P1], is perfectly general and hence may be equally deployed to undermine justified belief of any proposition failing its standard. Indeed, there seems equally good reason to think that the propositions which are the contents of most philosophical intuitions will not be part (outside of attitude contexts) of the best explanation of our having those intuitions. (See, for example, Alvin Goldman's similar skeptical arguments regarding the use of intuitions in contemporary metaphysics (1989, 1992).)

One possible response to this sort of argument is to concede [P1] and to argue, for the class of propositions at issue, that they do satisfy the necessary condition of justification. This maneuver is represented by Sturgeon's (1984) rejoinder to Harman. Sturgeon suggests that it is often reasonable to think that we wouldn't think some action or person possessed a relevant moral property unless they in fact possessed the property. More precisely, he holds that in order for a given act or agent to have a different moral status it or they would have to differ in some non-moral way and then we often would not take it or them to have the same moral status. However, whatever the plausibility of this account with respect to actual token actions or persons, it is less clear how the counterfactual criterion would apply to the moral status of actions featured in the merely hypothetical cases found in typical methodology. Moreover, even if one takes Sturgeon's maneuver to be successful against Harman's attack on moral intuitions, it seems quite unclear how it is to be extended to the many appeals to intuition catalogued above (§2).

It has also been argued that [P1] is unjustified (Pust 2001). There appear to be only two ways that [P1] could be justified. It might be justified by being intuitive or by being supported by our intuitions regarding particular cases of justified belief. [P1] is not, however, intuitive. Furthermore, an inductive argument for [P1] based on our intuitions about particular cases of justified belief will not support [P1] since many of what seem, intuitively, to be our most justified beliefs run afoul of [P1]. (See, for example, [I1]–[I4] from §1 and the examples in §2.2 and §2.3.) Many of our particular epistemic beliefs, moral beliefs, and modal beliefs seem, intuitively, no less justified than our empirical beliefs. Indeed, some of them seem more justified. Since it seems implausible that all of these propositions are required in the best explanation of the occurrence of our intuitions, it seems that [P1], which requires such a role, is undermined by such cases.

Even if there were sufficient intuitive support for [P1], defending this argument by such means would contravene both strands of the non-self-undermining constraint (Pust 2001). According to [P1], S's non-introspective belief that p is justified only if the proposition believed plays a role in the best explanation of S's mental states. No demonstration of explanatory relevance is involved in the two methods of justifying [P1] just discussed. Rather, each approach would take the mere fact that the principle is the content of an intuition or best explains the content of a set of particular intuitions (i.e., intuiteds) as sufficient for justified belief in that principle. This is to treat intuiteds as supporting evidence for a principle allowing only intuitings to count as evidence. Moreover, since [P1] states a necessary condition for the justified acceptance of any proposition not about the occurrence of an observation or intuition, acceptance of [P1] itself is justified only if it satisfies the very requirement it articulates. Unfortunately, because [P1] is a normative proposition about when a belief is justified, it is difficult to see how its truth could play any role in the explanation of the occurrence of any of our experiences or intuitions. However, if [P1] does not satisfy [P1], then, if [P1] is true, we cannot be justified in believing [P1].

3.4.2 可靠性是不可能的

The second argument from explanation has its origins in Benacerraf's (1973) epistemological objection to Platonism in mathematics. Benacerraf argued that the best semantic accounts of mathematics (e.g., Platonist ones) were in tension with our best theories of knowledge (e.g., causal ones) and that attempts to bring the truth conditions of mathematical statements into closer epistemic proximity to human subjects were semantically inadequate. Though he claimed to favor “a causal account of knowledge” and such an account is now generally thought mistaken, it should be noted that Benacerraf motivated the causal connection constraint by noting that one may justify the claim that S does not know p by arguing that S

could not have come into possession of the relevant evidence or reasons: that [S's] four-dimensional space-time worm does not make the necessary (causal) contact with the grounds of the truth of the proposition

for S to have adequate evidence (1973, p. 671).

Field (1989) provides a Benacerraf-style epistemic challenge to belief in mathematics (construed in a Platonist fashion), one which he alleges

does not depend on any theory of knowledge in the sense in which the causal theory is a theory of knowledge; that is it does not depend on any assumption about necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. (pp. 232–233)

On his account, the fundamental problem has to do with the impossibility of explaining “the reliability of our beliefs” in the domain in question. More precisely, he alleges that “if it appears impossible to explain” how our beliefs about some entities or our grounds for the beliefs “can so well reflect the facts about them,” then

that tends to undermine the belief in …. (these) entities, despite whatever initial reasons we might have for believing in them. (p. 26, emphasis added)

Though Field's argument has various of our beliefs as it target, it seems to support the following argument against intuition:

The Argument from Inexplicability of Reliability

  • [P1] If we have good reason to think that there is no explanation of why our intuitions are reliable, then we are not justified in believing p on the basis of the intuition that p.
  • [P2] We have good reason to think that there is no explanation of why our intuitions are reliable.
  • [C] We are not justified in believing p on the basis of the intuition that p.

The non-normative premise, [P2], seems to extend to all necessary truths if the explanation of reliability mentioned in [P1] requires any sort of counterfactual sustaining relation between the truth makers of the propositions in question and our psychological states. The failure of explanation here is intimately linked to the intuitive deviance of counterfactuals featuring in their antecedents the negations of necessary propositions. The standard semantics treats them as uniformly and vacuously true and so there is little informative sense to be made of the notion that were some proposition we take to be (necessarily) true to be false we would believe (or intuit) otherwise than we do. As it is implausible that all our beliefs in non-contingent matters are unjustified, this cuts against [P1] if it is taken to require a counterfactual supporting kind of explanation.

If, on the other hand, [P1] requires only that we have reason to think our reliability not utterly mysterious, then, while [P1] is more plausible, the relevant instance of [P2] may be false. It has been suggested that the provision of an explanation of our having the intuitions we do would, in virtue of the impossibility of such propositions as we intuit having different truth values, suffice as an explanation of their reliability. There is no particular reason to think that our intuitions lack explanation while our other mental states have an explanation. That explanation, when conjoined with our prima facie justification for believing the contents of our intuitions (and our being prima facie justified isn't challenged on this construal of the argument) seems to suffice as an explanation of our reliability. Put another way, if our reliability is a necessary accompaniment of having a certain content, then we have no reason to think our reliability is inexplicable. The explanation, in this sense, of our reliability is a straightforward consequence of the necessarily true contents of our intuitions and the psychological explanation for our having those particular intuitions (Pust 2004; Grundmann 2007, p. 84; but see Schechter 2010).

It may also be argued (Pust 2004) that it isn't, as seems assumed by Field's objection, clearly possible for a creature to have intuitions significantly different from our own. Given the more constrained accounts of intuition discussed above, it is not clear that a creature might have intuitions with contents generally contradicting our own. That such a creature is metaphysically possible is itself a modal claim apparently requiring justification by intuition and such intuitions seem to be lacking. This response to the explanationist can be elaborated in the context of a theory of concept possession according to which a necessary condition of the genuine possession of a given concept (of the sort of primary interest in philosophical investigation) is the reliability of one's intuitions regarding hypothetical cases. Such an account is justified by intuitions and so cannot be an independent justification of them. It may, however, still reasonably be thought to be an explanation (though not a causal one) of their (necessary) reliability.

Finally, just as was true with respect to the Argument from Lack of Explanatory Necessity, there remains the concern that any attempt to justify believing [P1] and [P2] will run afoul of the non-self-undermining constraint by relying on intuitions about justification and explanation in order to argue that intuitions do not justify belief.

3.5 对责难的辩护:自我支持与认识循环

There are, broadly speaking, two ways of defending the use of intuitions as evidence. The first possible defense would be an empirical defense of intuitions by arguing against the second premise of the Argument from Lack of Independent Calibration (§3.2). The defense would proceed by providing an inductive argument, based on non-intuitive evidence, that the contents of intuitions (either generally or of some specific sort) are reliable.

The only other apparent possible defense of the thesis that intuitions prima facie justify belief in their content appeals, as does the traditional rationalist, to the fact that there are many particular propositions which one seems justified in believing simply in virtue of their being the content of a rational intuition (Bealer 1998; Bonjour 1998). The strength of the conclusion is, of course, more supported to the extent that such examples are multiplied. And, as noted above, there appear to be many such examples.

This defense may be generalized by claiming that intuition is self-supporting insofar as the general claim that intuitions provide prima facie justification for belief in their contents is itself intuitive. The possibility of such a defense is the result of the same fact that revealed that all of the extant local skeptical arguments run afoul of the non-self-undermining constraint—the fact that intuitions seem to be the only source of justification for claims about justification, reason, evidence and other epistemic concepts.

The obvious concern about this sort of defense (in both its particular and general form) is the fact that it necessarily involves epistemic circularity of some kind. That is, it defends the appeal to intuitions as reasons for belief by appeal to intuitions. It seems clear that epistemically circular defenses are sometimes illegitimate, as when questions about the epistemic probity of appeals to a crystal ball are answered by consulting the ball. However, as indicated above (§3.2), it also appears that some sort of epistemic circularity is inevitable in the attempt to defend our most basic modes of evidence and justification. Exactly when such circularity is epistemically disabling and when, if ever, it is acceptable is a difficult question which cannot be here treated in detail (Alston 1986, 1993; Bergmann 2006; Cohen 2002; Vogel 2008). However, a few remarks are in order.

First, if epistemic circularity is always unacceptable, then it is impossible to defend the appeal to intuition. However, the same result will follow (ultimately) for any putative source of evidence. So, while it will be the case that the use of intuitions as evidence cannot be defended, it will also follow that the reliance on perception, memory and introspection can also not be defended. Universal skepticism would appear to follow. Alternatively, if epistemic circularity is sometimes acceptable, then no reason has been provided why it is not acceptable in the case of rational intuition.

Second, if we focus on the question of whether we are prima facie justified in accepting the contents of our intuitions, there may be a feature which distinguishes intuition from all other putative sources of evidence. Only intuition is clearly capable of epistemic self-support because it is the only source which produces non-doxastic states with epistemically normative content. Whether or not apparent perception that p, introspection that p, or apparent memory that p justify us in believing their content is, it seems, a question they cannot answer as their content is never epistemic. Hence, intuition appears distinguishable from our other putative sources of evidence in being both required for a coherent epistemology and capable of epistemic self-support. So, if any source of evidence can be defended against global skeptical attack, it seems that intuitions can.

Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that the epistemic credentials of intuitions can be defended by appealing to similarities between perceptual justification and intuitive justification or to a general doctrine regarding non-inferential justification. According to perceptual dogmatism, a person having a perceptual experience or a perceptual seeming with propositional content p is thereby prima facie justified in believing p (Pryor 2000). According to intuitive dogmatism, a person having an intuition or intellectual seeming with propositional content p is thereby prima facie justified in believing p. According to general dogmatism, when it seems to a person that p, that person is thereby prima facie justified in believing p. It follows from general dogmatism that intuitions, as characterized by the various versions of the sui generis state view above (§1.3), are a source of justification (Huemer 2005, 2007). Moreover, it seems extremely plausible that if perceptual dogmatism is true, then so is intuitive dogmatism (Chudnoff 2011b; Koksvik 2011).

Whatever the merits of general or perceptual dogmatism, it is important to recognize that appealing to them in defending intuitive dogmatism involves exactly the same sort of epistemic circularity as that involved in the more straightforward defense previously noted. This is because all versions of dogmatism are themselves justified entirely on intuitive grounds—by the fact that they properly accommodate our various intuitions about the conditions under which a person has non-inferential propositional justification. Hence, appeals to dogmatism of any sort are ultimately justified only if intuitions do provide prima facie justification and so cannot serve as an independent defense of the appeal to intuitions. Epistemic circularity in the epistemology of intuition appears unavoidable.

4. 实验哲学和直觉

4.1 实验哲学的本质

在过去十年左右,对哲学直觉进行科学的或经验化的研究广泛进行。 这样的项目现在经常被归入“实验哲学”的范畴。注:实验哲学的一般描述,参见Knobe和Nichols 2008,Appiah 2008,Nadelhoffer和Nahmias 2007。

实验哲学至少可以区分为至少四个项目:

第一:“心理学项目”旨在发现人们通常的想法。 Knobe和Nichols声称这样研究的结果“对我们自身权利有着巨大的哲学意义...对于传统的哲学问题而言”(2008,第12页)。 这个主张的部分理由是——那些在历史上被哲学家广泛研究的问题都应该算作是哲学的重要问题。许多哲学家在古代和现代早期对人类心理学的本质有各种各样的论述,这些被算作是哲学问题的问题可以通过现代心理学研究更好地研究。

第二:“验证项目”旨在确定哲学家所称的直觉是什么——前理论或常识中的各种命题是否对普通人来说是符合直觉的。这个项目研究这些内容:直觉被所共同拥有的程度、怀疑哲学家的自觉可能来自于专业的训练、理论效忠(theoretical allegiance)或一般认知偏见的结果(Nadelhoffer和Nahmias 2007,第125页; Knobe和Nichols 2008,第9页)。这种方法的一个例子可以在Nahmias及其同事对自由意志的研究中找到(2006,2007)。

第三: “源项目”旨在发现人们产生直觉的心理机制或过程。根据Knobe和Nichols,它的目的是“希望...我们可以使用信息方法来确定心理的来源...根据来源确立信仰的效力”(2008年,第9页)。 类似地,Allman和Woodward建议

更好地理解道德直觉的来源和特征将有助于澄清直觉是否以及何时在道德论证中具有合法的作用。(2008,第167页)

这种方法的例子包括:Greene的(Greene等人2001; Greene 2003,第848页)fMRI对道德判断的研究(Berker 2009进行了批评),Horowitz 1998年尝试(也参见Sunstein 2005)支持使用Kahneman和Tversky的前景理论(Kamm 1998和van Roojen 1999进行了批评)以及Nichols和Knobe(2007)关于角色对决定论与道德责任的兼容性的判断的作用的研究的观点。

第四:“变异项目”试图确定不同群体的直觉的变化程度。 许多工作认为,经验发现使我们有理由相信直觉是不可靠的(Alexander et al. 2010)。这种方法的例子(追溯到Stich 1988的主要知识谱系)包括Weinberg et al。(2001)关于知识的直觉的跨文化差异(Sosa 2007进行批评),Swain et al。(2008)在关于知识的直觉中的秩序效应(Sosa 2007进行批评)和Machery等人(2004)和Mallon et al。(2009)。关于参考的直觉的跨文化差异(Ludwig 2007; Devitt 2011; Deutsch 2009; Sytsma 和 Livengood 2010进行批评)。

4.2 实验证据

For experimental philosophers seeking to investigate the sources, character and distribution of intuitions of philosophical interest, the primary method has consisted of asking subjects questions about hypothetical scenarios, or less frequently, about principles or generalizations. The evidence has been responses (whether binary [yes/no] responses or graded [Likert scale] responses) to such survey questions. Those pursuing the sources project and the variation project also aim to determine which factors co-vary with answers—cultural or ethnic group, socio-economic status, region of brain or cognitive processes implicated in answering the question, psychopathology, order of questions, framing of questions, etc.

Of course, traditional first-person armchair methods seek to determine which features of the content of the scenario under consideration vary with one's intuitions. Indeed, this is exactly how one endeavors to test or to make more precise some general thesis in many areas of philosophy. Proponents of the sources project and the variation project however, seek to determine which features of those considering the scenario or of framing or presenting the same question vary with the relevant intuitions.

There have been a variety of worries raised about the adequacy of survey methods as means of gaining access to intuitions of the relevant sort. The strength of these worries vary according to the conception of intuition. If, as claimed by various sui generis state accounts (§1.3), intuitions are not beliefs or mere dispositions to believe, then the inferential route from evidence consisting of survey responses to conclusions about intuitions is considerably lengthened.

First, differences in responses may be produced by different ways of “filling in” a schematic hypothetical case (Sosa 2007). Second, there may be multiple concepts answering to a single word (Sosa 2007). (For some recognition of this fact by experimental philosophers, see the use of the “coin-flipping” case by Weinberg et al. (2001) and Swain et al. (2008) to exclude subjects who use “S knows that p” to mean merely that S has high confidence that p.) These two suggestions do not raise the possibility that that the subjects in such surveys are not responding on the basis of intuitions. Rather, they raise the possibility that the intuitions are not intuitions regarding the same property or about the same case. (See Alexander and Weinberg 2007 for the suggestion that both of these concerns apply equally to non-solipsistic proponents of the traditional armchair methodology.)

A third, more general, worry is that such surveys run a risk of eliciting from subjects responses determined by something other than their intuitions regarding the answer to the survey question—e.g., by implicatures determined by what a sentence is typically used to communicate (Adams and Steadman 2004; Deutch 2009; Bach 2002) and by more general pragmatic factors governing the determination of speaker meaning and task interpretation. These worries may be especially pressing in the odd and ambiguous context of a set of hypothetical and often bizarre cases presented by a philosopher to a philosophically naïve subject unaware of the nature of the discipline (Scholl 2007, p. 580; Cullen 2010; Ludwig 2007). Bengson (forthcoming) argues that it is plausible that survey responses are often not indicative of subjects' intuitions but are instead the product of guesses, hunches or inferences.

Some proponents of survey methods claim that such worries have very low prior probability and should not be taken seriously without experimental confirmation. Those who raise them, however, claim to have significant independent evidence of their general relevance (Cullen 2010; Scholl 2007) or their importance in producing the particular results at issue. Some of these problems seem difficult to control for without engaging subjects in something like philosophical dialogue and dialectic (see Kauppinen 2007)—i.e., by doing philosophy with them—which is thought by many experimental philosophers to be a form of biasing or data contamination.

Nothing precludes experimental philosophers from circumventing such concerns by using experimental paradigms other than the administering of surveys. They may use reaction-time studies from cognitive psychology (Arico et al. 2011), empirical evidence from neuroscience (Allman and Woodward 2008; Greene et. al. 2001), evolutionary biology or other sources. While such sources of evidence are not subject to the difficulties of surveys, they also appear unlikely to produce direct evidence of use to the verification project or the variability project because these projects require responses to the abstract and detailed linguistic descriptions of cases one typically presents in philosophical analysis. Indeed, Scholl (2007) suggests that the most methodologically satisfactory experimental philosophy will be primarily a version of the sources project implicating rather low-level processes immune, in virtue of their modularity, from the interpretive and pragmatic difficulties outlined above.

4.3 实验哲学和怀疑性责难

The sources project is, as noted above, often presented as a possible means of justifying skepticism regarding some class of philosophical intuitions. An analogy suggested by Knobe and Nichols (2008) is to debunking explanations of religious beliefs. Theorists engaged in such projects argue that religious belief (or religious experience on which such belief is based) is produced by some questionable process such as wish fulfillment, desire for a father figure, cultural indoctrination, etc. It is then argued (or assumed) that this fact about the source of the belief (or its direct internal ground) undermines the epistemic credentials of such beliefs.

This may suggest that some skeptical proponents of the sources project aim to motivate an instance of the Argument from Unreliability (§3.3). As an example, consider Greene's fMRI-based arguments (Greene et al. 2001; Greene 2003, 2007) against certain “characteristically deontological” intuitions in ethics. The primary experimental data on which his argument is based is the fact that portions of the brain independently implicated in emotional reaction are more active when subjects consider cases giving rise to characteristically deontological intuitions than when they consider cases giving rise to characteristically consequentialist intuitions. However, critics will allege (§3.3) that attempts to show that a process is unreliable (independent of disagreement) require independent access to the target domain and such intuition-independent access seems lacking for most of the target domains of philosophical inquiry. In this vein, Berker (2009) argues that the best argument in Greene's work rests largely on other intuitions about the general normative insignificance of the factors within hypothetical cases to which Greene believes deontological intuitions are responsive. (See Unger (1996) for an entirely a priori criticism of many “characteristically deontological” intuitions for their apparent responsiveness to intuitively normatively insignificant factors.)

The aforementioned analogy to debunking explanations of religious belief might also be taken to suggest a version of the Argument from Lack of Explanatory Necessity (§3.4.1). According to that argument, the provision of an explanation of the occurrence of the intuitions in question (the intuitings) which does not appeal to the truth of their contents (the intuiteds) undermines belief in their contents. The role of experimental work might be thought to be to support the factual premise of that argument (see Greene 2003, p. 849 for such a suggestion). As we have seen (§3.4.2), critics will claim that the argument relies on a questionable normative premise and violates the non-self-undermining constraint. They may also suggest that the plausibility of the non-normative premise of the argument derives from very general armchair (perhaps even entirely a priori) reflections on the contents of the intuitions, their truth-makers, and the nature of explanation.

Some proponents of the variation project present us empirical evidence of disagreement between intuitions in order to motivate a version of the Argument from Intrasource Inconsistency (§3.3.2). Some critics of skepticism motivated by the variation project claim, contrary to what was suggested earlier (§2.4), that intuitions are not treated as evidence or reasons in philosophical inquiry (Deutsch 2010; Williamson 2007). Whether such a maneuver really evades whatever skeptical implications follow from disagreement depends on whether disagreements of belief are epistemologically less troubling than variations in non-doxastic justifiers.

Though critical of the variation project, Sosa's suggests that

there will definitely be a prima facie problem for the appeal to intuitions in philosophy if surveys show that there is extensive enough disagreement on the subject matter supposedly open to intuitive access. (Sosa 2007)

Relevant to determining whether the antecedent of Sosa's conditional is satisfied are the methodological concerns about survey methods noted above and their ability to support claims of intuition disagreement. Relevant to determining the possibility of the antecedent of Sosa's conditional being satisfied are the distinctively a priori concerns raised above (§3.4.2) about the possible extent of disagreement, about how the existence of widespread disagreement could be justifiably believed to exist (§3.3.2), and, importantly, about the non-self-undermining constraint.

5. 供进一步研究用参考书目

根据上面的内容可以发现下面三个问题可能特别有益。

第一是试图更准确地表达直觉的确切性质或提供各种直觉的原则性分类方法。这将使各种哲学家和心理学家避免无谓的争论,并允许进一步探索心理和认识之间的感知和直觉问题。

第二是确定认识论循环是有问题的精确条件。这将有助于确定直觉和感知的相对的初始的认识论立场。

第三是确定直觉的分歧、它的程度以及对其的反应。这将使得怀疑论论证得以合适的评价。

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  1. 罗素 1902 年在弗雷格《算术基本规律》一书中发现了所谓的罗素悖论,它表明朴素集合论的两条公理导致矛盾。这两条公理分别是概括公理(Comprehension Axiom)和外延公理(Axiom of Extensionality)。一阶概括公理是说,任何公式都定义一个集合。一阶外延公理是说,两个集合相等当且仅当它们由相同的元素构成。举例来说,依据概括公理,我们定义不属于自身的集合r,根据外延公理,不属于自身的这个集合属于自身当且仅当它不属于自身,产生矛盾。  

  2. 德·摩根首先发现了在命题逻辑中存在着下面这些关系:非(P且Q)=(非P)或(非Q),非(P或Q)=(非P)且(非Q)。  

  3. [拉丁语:关于命题的]“从言”命题和“从物”(de re,拉丁语,关于事物的)命题的区分,由于托马斯·阿奎那的工作而获得流行。从言命题用某些词项对作为一个整体的主谓式命题作出断言,从而形成一个二阶陈述。从物命题则用某些词项对主词作出断言。这一区分有广泛的应用,但在关于模态命题(有关必然性和可能性的命题)的分析中特别重要。从言模态与把“必然地”或“或能的”归属于一命题有关,例如“苏格拉底在跑是可能的。”从物模态与把这些模态术语归属于一主词或对象有关,例如“苏格拉底可能在跑”。从言解释和从物解释对于同一命题将导致不同的真值。随着对模态逻辑和本质主义兴趣的复苏,有关这一区分的争论也再次流行起来。  

  4. 1905年《论指谓》中,罗素首次提出亲知知识(knowledge by acquaintance)与摹状知识(knowledge by description)的区分,并将亲知界定为“当我们对一个客体具有直接的认知关系时,我们可以说你亲知到了它”。直接性是亲知论题的标志性特征。罗素认为,这种直接的认知关系将排除判断,是构成呈现(presentation)的一部分。罗素打算将亲知刻画为一种基础主义式的知识,这种知识不仅具有直接性,还能够为我们的知识大厦提供基础。  

  5. 传统知识论认为:知识是得到确证的真信念。葛梯尔难题对这一问题提出了反例。比较著名的就是这一“‘得到职位的人兜里有十个硬币’是一个得到确证的真信念,但知道它”。  

  6. 沼泽人(swampman)思想实验是1987年美国哲学家唐纳德·戴维森提出的思考实验,常常用于思考“我到底是什么”这一自我认证的命题。某个人出门去散步,在经过一个沼泽边上的时候不幸的被闪电击中而死亡。与此同时在他的旁边正好也有一束闪电击中了沼泽,十分罕见的是这个落雷和沼泽发生了反应,产生了一个与刚才死掉的人无论形体还是质量都完全相同的生物。我们将这个新产生的生物叫做沼泽人。沼泽人在原子级别上与原来那个人的构造完全相同,外观也完全一样,当然大脑的状态(被落雷击中的人死前的大脑状态)也完全被复制了下来,也就是记忆和知识看起来也完全一样。走出沼泽的沼泽人就像刚死去的男人一样边散步边回到了家中,然后打开了刚死去的男人的家门,和刚死去的男人的家人打电话,接着边读刚死去的男人没读完的书边睡去。第二天早上起床后,沼泽人到刚死去的男人的公司上班。  

2016-12-14 02:05 experimental-philosophy
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