斯坦福哲学百科词条:直觉（作者:Joel Pust）

Pust, Joel, "Intuition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/intuition/.

1. 什么是直觉？
2. 直觉在哲学理论（或者其他扶手椅式学问——指研究问题不通过实验进行）研究中的地位是什么？
3. 直觉的地位是否符合实际，被高估还是被低看？
4. 对这一地位的直觉进行经验性研究能够说明什么问题？（补充材料：思想实验的逻辑结构
5. 思想实验给我们提供了怎样的直觉内容？

1. 直觉的本质

• I1：非非P是P。
• I2：为了快乐而虐待一只猫是错误的。
• I3：正方形不可能有五条边。
• I4：将大脑移植进新的身体后人能继续存活。

1.1 直觉是信念

• A1：S有直觉P当且仅当S有信念P。

• A2：S有直觉P，当且仅当S形成P的信念：并非有意识地从一些其他信念推断而出。

A2命题说明：有意识的、包含推理的信念不是直觉。然而A2仍然错误地包含了非推理的感知信念——记忆信念和内省的信念作为直觉。此外，另一个错误A2同A1一样：事实上一个人可以直觉到自己不相信的东西（没有信念）。前一个错误可以被规避（非推理性信念或由病态信念得到的进一步限制），后一个问题似乎不容易被规避。

• A3：S有直觉P，当且仅当S形成的信念P基于与P符合的概念。

A3命题规避了A1、A2命题的错误：它不将内省、记忆或感知（感觉）的信念作为直觉。然而（理由有三），（第一：命题空洞）假设我们所讨论的概念不是矛盾的，A3命题可能意味着直觉是不可能的（无法被讨论的），因为这取决于与P符合的概念的要求是什么。（第二：存在反例）即使直觉是不可能的：S没有符合A3理论的直觉，但S仍然可能有直觉。（第三：循环论证）最后，A3包含了直接的内省判断：人们有难以证明的不能内省到自身无意识信念的原因的直觉。

1.2 直觉是信念倾向

Peter van Inwagen认为直觉是这样的：

• A4：S有直觉P，当且仅当S倾向于相信P。

• A5：S有直觉P，当且仅当S倾向于相信P是因为理解P。

1.3 直觉是特别的状态

• A6：S有直觉P，当且仅当P显现于S。

• A7：S有直觉P，当且仅当P在智性上显现于S。

• A8：S有理性的直觉P，当前仅当P在智性上必然显现于S。
• A9：S有理性的直觉P ，当且仅当：

[A]（1）P在智性上显现于S，（2）如果S要考虑P是否必然为真，P在智性上必然显现于S；

A8认为理智直觉是种能力，是模态的（动态的，语境化的），在某一时刻t将概念c展现于思想中的能力。也就是说，理智直觉P是必然地、智性地呈现于S面前的，只有做到了这点，我们才能说S有理智直觉P。这种智性能力，需要一定程度的深思熟虑。虽然对哲学一无所知的人或许也会有一些理智直觉，但这种能力的显现不如深思熟虑的人明显（Pust 2000，p38; Ludwig 2007，p136）。此外，在智性上并非必然显现的直觉对哲学实践也是必要的，如果[A8]的支持者希望自己的直觉解释理论能够包含它在内（而不是将它们看作是由理性直觉推倒得出，认可必要性原则），那么他们也必须将这样的直觉视为模态命题。

（见Pust 2000，p46）A9要求理智直觉中包含单一的非静态的有意识地心理状态，并且把这种状态从物理直觉中区分开来，认为朴素的主体即使不能够实时的处理形而上学必要性的概念，他也可能有理智直觉。A9同样不要求并非必然显现的直觉里包含模态内容。然而，因为这一命题许多时候使用倾向性，而非直觉是否具有动态因素来区分理智直觉与物理直觉（或者其他的直觉），它可能产生一些问题，从而错误的认为：我们有能力直接辩别自己是否持有理智直觉。

“智性上的显像”的支持者必须去解释其他理论的错误，然后使自己的想法得以实现。（见Chudnoff 2011a和Koksvik 2011，他们描述了这样的怀疑论者应该寻求什么。）

Williamson（2007，pp218-219）反对以上的直觉分类，指出各种各样的命题内都包含不是知觉或“反直觉”的东西，因此支持更宽容的观点：直觉是信念或信念倾向（直觉是倾向于相信）。在他看来，直觉的分类不应仅仅包括否定命题（对其进行更多的限制），Williamson举例指出，本节的观点意味着我们通常所思考的山不存在，这是高度反直觉的。然而，有的命题认为我们思考的东西存在，只不过那些东西在任何意义上都不是直觉的内容。

2. 直觉的认识论地位

2.2 思想实验

• 葛梯尔难题（Gettier 1963）：

Gettier直觉：史密斯不知道得到这份工作的人口袋里有十个银币5

• 器官移植难题（Thomson 1976）：

• 中国人的国家难题（Block 1978）

• 旗杆难题（Bromberger 1966）

（参见补充材料“思想实验的逻辑结构”，以进一步讨论这种推理的逻辑结构。）

附录：思想实验的逻辑结构

2.2节四个例子的逻辑结构很清楚： 首先，每一个理论或者解释都被置身于必要的双条件情景之中，然后，通过诉诸一个假设，说明尽管理论解释看起来是充分的，但实际上如果正在被分析的内容是不存在的（冲突是不存在的），那么该理论是正确的，如果正在被分析的内容存在（冲突存在），那么该理论有缺陷。

• K(x, p)：x 知道 p。
• JTB(x, p)： x 有确证的真信念 p。
• GC(x, p)：在葛梯尔语境下，x 代表 p。
• (1) ◊∃x∃p GC(x, p)
• (2) □∀x∀p (GC(x, p) ⊃ (JTB(x, p) & ~K(x, p)))

• (3)◊∃x∃p (JTB(x, p) & ~K(x, p))
• (3) 违背JTB理论，解释为：□∀x∀p (JTB(x, p) = K(x, p))。

Williamson 自己对这一错误的回应是将（2）变为一个反事实论断。产生了下面的结果：

• (1) ◊∃x∃p GC(x, p)
• (2c) ∃x∃p GC(x, p) ，反事实条件是：∀x∀p (GC(x, p) ⊃ (JTB(x, p) & ~K(x, p)))

• (3) ◊∃x∃p (JTB(x, p) & ~K(x, p))

• (2pc) ◊(∃x∃p GC(x, p) ，反事实条件是： ∀x∀p (GC(x, p) ⊃ (JTB(x, p) & ~K(x, p)))).

（2pc）将避免上面提到的关于（2c）的问题，并且Williamson允许S5将使我们能够从（1）和（2pc）推导出（3）。 不过，他拒绝这种重建，因为它不同于（1）和（2c）的论点，（a）S5的相关原则的正确性，和（b）将对这些原则的承诺归于从来没有考虑他们（the attribution of a commitment to such principles to people who have never considered them.）。

• (1f) ◊g
• (2f) □(g ⊃ ∃x∃p (JTB(x, p) & ~K(x, p)))

• (3) ∃x∃p (JTB(x, p) & ~K(x, p))

2.3 普遍直觉

2.2节介绍了四个关于哲学理论的特殊思想实验。然而，这样的诉诸直觉的例子有很多，比如那些认识论的理性主义者所采用的那些。为了这样的目的，认识论的理性主义者认为有些命题的确证与否并不是依据感觉经验、内省和记忆的，而是理性直觉。(Bonjour 1998; Bealer 1998).

• [R1] 没有东西可以既是红色又是绿色的。
• [R2] 2 + 2 = 4
• [R3] 如果A比B高，B比C高，那么A比C高。
• [R4] 不存在圆的方。
• [R5] （P 和 Q） 蕴含 Q.

• [G1] 如果S有证成的相信p，并且有证成的相信□(p ⊃ q)，那么S有证成的相信q。
• [G2] 如果X是一堆沙子，那么拿走一粒沙子后它仍然是一个沙堆。
• [G3] S可以自由的进行动作A仅当S可以不这么做。
• [G4] 对于每一个属性P，总有一个集合（即使是空集合）拥有P。
• [G5] 通过给定的一个点，一定存在一个线段能够与给定的线段（不在给定点上）平行。
• [G6] 后者y是否在数量上等同于前者x，这样的判断能否完全的建立在有关y与x和x与y的关系的直觉之上。
• [G7] 任何两种在非道德方面相同的行动，必然在道德方面也相同。（Any two possible actions exactly alike in all non-moral respects must be exactly alike in all moral respects. ）

3. 问题与辩护

3.2 无法校准论证

• [P1] 只有当人们相信证据的来源是可靠的时候，才有理由相信一个证据的内容。
• [P2] 我们缺乏对直觉是可靠信念的独立理由。
• [C] 我们没有理由相信直觉的内容。

[P2]是什么意思？ 不论证词的非还原性陈述，考虑到上面的关于论证的约束，所有哲学相关的直觉似乎都是不能独立校准的。主要原因在于直觉的内容与合适的由独立来源证明的信念之间并不等同，它们经常不是一个东西，不相关。似乎，我们不能使用感官来辨别某些情况是否为知识、行动是否正当、实体是否有意识、时间上不同的两个人是同一个人。同样，虽然知觉可能说明某些命题是否为真或者它的可能性，但它不能表明非实际真理的可能性或任何命题的必要性。

3.3 不可靠性论证

• [P1] 人有确定的推理来源的证据的条件是：当且仅当这一证据是可靠的。（One is justified in believing on the (sole) basis of a putative source of evidence only if it is reliable.）
• [P2] 直觉（或关于类型T的直觉）不可靠。
• [C] （仅仅）基于直觉（或T型的直觉）的信念是不能被确证的。

• [P1] 人有确定的推理来源的证据的条件是：当且仅当他没有理由相信这一条件是不可靠的。
• [P2] 我们有（不败的：可以确证的）认为直觉（或T型的直觉）不可靠的原因。
• [C] 因此，基于（仅仅）直觉（或T型直觉）的信念是不可以被确证的。

As the defense of [P1] or [P1`] requires appeal to epistemic intuitions, any attempt to justify by such means a skeptical conclusion regarding all intuitions, all epistemic intuitions or even all normative intuitions, would fail to observe the non-self-undermining constraint.

Still, it is worth considering the possible ways of attempting to justify skeptical arguments of a more limited sort by arguing that intuitions of some sort (which does not include epistemic intuitions or at least the epistemic intuitions of the sort needed to justify the premises) are unreliable. Given that the relevant non-normative premise must claim that intuitions of the sort at issue are more frequently false than true (or equally likely to be false as to be true) it seems to require an inductive justification based on a sufficiently large number of cases in which we have justification for believing ~p while p is the content of an intuition.

One way of developing the case would involve a sufficiently large number of cases in which one has an intuition-independent justification for thinking ~p while intuition testifies that p (intrapersonal intersource inconsistency). Another would involve a sufficiently large number of cases in which one has the intuition that p and either oneself or some other person has the intuition that ~p. In the intrapersonal case, this might involve our finding a given proposition intuitive and, at some other time, our finding its explicit negation intuitive (intrapersonal intrasource inconsistency). More likely is a less direct inconsistency, as when we have two intuitions which, though not the explicit propositional negations of each other, can be shown to contradict with the aid of some other justified principle. Many contemporary skeptics, however, wish to appeal to interpersonal disagreement as justification for their skepticism. Here we should distinguish between cases in which some other person has intuition-independent justification for believing the negation of the content of one of one's own intuitions (interpersonal intersource inconsistency) and cases in which the other person has an intuition with a content contradicting one's own intuition or, perhaps, fails to have any intuition regarding p (interpersonal intrasource inconsistency).

3.3.1 组间不一致

As noted when conceding the factual premise, [P2], of the Argument from Lack of Independent Calibration (§3.2), on the sui generis accounts of intuition (§1.3), there are few, if any, direct conflicts between the putative deliverances of rational intuition and our other sources of evidence (Bealer 1998; Bonjour 1998). Indirect conflicts would be ones in which the results of empirical theory contradict the content of rational intuitions. Such cases, if there are any, are quite rare.

Indeed, in view of the lack of direct conflicts, there is substantial reason to think indirect conflicts must be quite rare as standard empirical theorizing seems unlikely to yield conclusions about the domains about which intuition seems to inform us. These facts suggest that interpersonal interfaculty inconsistency will also be an insufficient basis for skepticism.

3.3.2 组内不一致

The main case of intrapersonal intrasource inconsistency has been mentioned previously—the case of paradoxes. To support the present (limited) skeptical argument, however, it must be parlayed into an argument that intuitions are so unreliable as to fail to justify belief at all.

It is not clear how this can be done. For one thing, there remains the fact that most of a person's intuitions are not in conflict with one another. For another, some conflicts between intuitions can be resolved by standard means or by favoring the more intuitive propositions. This is not to claim that such disagreements might not rationally require a suspension of judgment about the actual contradicting intuitions (if they are suitably balanced in strength). However, such a conclusion is quite limited and extends clearly only to areas of demonstrable and irresolvable inconsistency.

The case of greatest interest to skeptics is likely to be the case of interpersonal intrasource inconsistency or disagreement. We must be careful to distinguish between interpersonal conflicts of intuitions and conflicts between beliefs or between beliefs and intuitions. Philosophers disagree a great deal about the correct theory of free will, knowledge, justification and the like. This fact has been alleged to make a certain sort of epistemic modesty (though not complete skepticism) about the theoretical accomplishments of philosophy quite reasonable (Christensen 2007). However, philosophers seem to disagree less about what the relevant intuitions are. Bealer claims that

the on-balance agreement among our elementary concrete-case intuitions is one of the most impressive general facts about human cognition. (1998, p. 214)

(See, however, “the variation project” of experimental philosophers discussed in §4.1.) Functionalists, for example, don't usually claim to lack the intuition that the Chinese nation (Block 1978) would lack qualia. Rather, they often go to great lengths to explain away such intuitions, formulate the functionalist theory to accommodate them (Putnam 1967), or selectively deflate their epistemic value. Reliabilists don't typically claim that there is no new evil demon problem (Cohen 1984). Rather, they engage in considerable maneuvering to discount the intuition, to rephrase it in a way not damaging to straightforward reliabilism, or, most commonly, to provide an alternative, recognizably reliabilist, theory which accommodates the intuition.

Much of the recent literature on the epistemic significance of disagreement is focused on cases in which two persons disagree with respect to a single proposition which is inferentially justified, and in which the two parties are known to each other to have the same evidence and general cognitive virtues (Christensen 2009). The lessons of such cases for the present questions are likely to be limited. If intuitions are evidence which non-inferentially justify belief, then even if one ought to suspend judgment in the aforementioned kind of case, it will not follow that one ought to do so in the case of intuitive disagreements. Hence, we must instead focus on cases of disagreement between non-inferentially justified beliefs or, more appropriately, on the propositional content of some non-doxastic basis for such belief. Feldman (2007) provides a perceptual case (explicitly compared to something like rational intuition) in which one person seems to see p and the other, similarly situated, does not seem to see p. When the two become apprised of each other's appearances (and know each other to have equally good vision and to be honest), Feldman avers that they must withhold judgment on p. Perhaps the same is true with respect to philosophical intuitions.

However, it can be difficult to determine if another's failure to have an intuition that p is epistemically significant, as they may have yet to really grasp or consider the precise proposition at issue. An analogous claim is true in the perceptual case as well, as when one sees an object which is well camouflaged and another claims not to see it. Still, restricting ourselves to a situation in which one has good reason to think the other fully understands the content at issue and claims either not to have the intuition or to have the contrary intuition, we must ask what the appropriate responses to such cases is. Here, it does seem that the proper response is sometimes (depending on the proposition at issue) suspension of belief or some suitable diminution of credence (Bonjour 1998, pp. 138–142). Even if the correct response to disagreement about p in such cases is the suspension of belief (or a reduction of credence), it won't follow that beliefs in propositions about which no known disagreement exists are undermined. Nor could it follow that one must always have independent reason to think there is no disagreement prior to being justified in accepting the content of an intuition. That would be impossible.

A serious case for disagreement-based local skepticism regarding some entire class of intuitions which evades the non-self-undermining constraint would require justification for thinking that quite substantial disagreement with some equally (or more) competent other person has arisen. It cannot be supposed that the question of whether one is justified in thinking that some apparent competent interlocutor is sincerely testifying that p is entirely independent of the content of their apparent assertion or of one's total evidence relevant to existence of other minds and their mental contents of the appropriate sort. Some sorts of apparent disagreement call into question the understanding, sanity, intelligence or sincerity of one's interlocutor, as when some other denies some basic truth of arithmetic. Consider a version of Feldman's perceptual case in which there are successive occasions on which one seems to see p and one's interlocutor apparently denies that they see any such thing. Were they to become frequent enough, there might be reason to doubt that the other is honest and competent, speaking one's language, or, indeed, whether there is another person to whom one is speaking. Similar obstacles arise for the possibility of very widespread disagreement of intuitions, especially on views according to which the reliability of intuitions is constitutive of possessing certain concepts (Bealer 1998; Huemer 2005; Ludwig 2007).

3.4 解释性论证

3.4.1 缺乏解释的必要性

Gilbert Harman (1977) suggests that moral theories are unjustified because they cannot be tested and confirmed in the way that scientific theories can. While he admits that we may “test” general moral principles against our intuitions regarding particular actual and hypothetical situations, he argues that we are not thereby testing our moral theories or principles against the world. Instead, we are merely testing them against our “moral sensibility” or against our tacitly held moral views.

Harman claims that there is an important difference between the use of observations in empirical science and the use of intuitions in moral inquiry, a difference which renders moral intuitions unable to provide evidence for moral theory. The alleged difference is that

you need to make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the occurrence of the observations that support a scientific theory, but you do not seem to need to make assumptions about any moral facts to explain the occurrence

of the moral intuitions. When, for example, one has the intuition, in the Transplant case, that it would be wrong for a doctor to kill an unconsenting healthy patient to save the lives of five other patients,

an assumption about moral facts would seem to be totally irrelevant to the explanation of your making the judgment you make

and hence the intuition “does not seem … to be … evidence for or against any moral theory” (1977, pp. 6–7). The argument seems to be:

The Argument from Lack of Explanatory Necessity

• [P1] Aside from propositions describing the occurrence of her introspectively accessible states, S is justified in believing only those propositions which are part of the best explanation of the occurrence of those introspectively accessible states.
• [P2] Moral propositions are not part of the best explanation of the occurrence of S's introspectively accessible states.
• [C] S is not justified in believing moral propositions.

The normative premise, [P1], is perfectly general and hence may be equally deployed to undermine justified belief of any proposition failing its standard. Indeed, there seems equally good reason to think that the propositions which are the contents of most philosophical intuitions will not be part (outside of attitude contexts) of the best explanation of our having those intuitions. (See, for example, Alvin Goldman's similar skeptical arguments regarding the use of intuitions in contemporary metaphysics (1989, 1992).)

One possible response to this sort of argument is to concede [P1] and to argue, for the class of propositions at issue, that they do satisfy the necessary condition of justification. This maneuver is represented by Sturgeon's (1984) rejoinder to Harman. Sturgeon suggests that it is often reasonable to think that we wouldn't think some action or person possessed a relevant moral property unless they in fact possessed the property. More precisely, he holds that in order for a given act or agent to have a different moral status it or they would have to differ in some non-moral way and then we often would not take it or them to have the same moral status. However, whatever the plausibility of this account with respect to actual token actions or persons, it is less clear how the counterfactual criterion would apply to the moral status of actions featured in the merely hypothetical cases found in typical methodology. Moreover, even if one takes Sturgeon's maneuver to be successful against Harman's attack on moral intuitions, it seems quite unclear how it is to be extended to the many appeals to intuition catalogued above (§2).

It has also been argued that [P1] is unjustified (Pust 2001). There appear to be only two ways that [P1] could be justified. It might be justified by being intuitive or by being supported by our intuitions regarding particular cases of justified belief. [P1] is not, however, intuitive. Furthermore, an inductive argument for [P1] based on our intuitions about particular cases of justified belief will not support [P1] since many of what seem, intuitively, to be our most justified beliefs run afoul of [P1]. (See, for example, [I1]–[I4] from §1 and the examples in §2.2 and §2.3.) Many of our particular epistemic beliefs, moral beliefs, and modal beliefs seem, intuitively, no less justified than our empirical beliefs. Indeed, some of them seem more justified. Since it seems implausible that all of these propositions are required in the best explanation of the occurrence of our intuitions, it seems that [P1], which requires such a role, is undermined by such cases.

Even if there were sufficient intuitive support for [P1], defending this argument by such means would contravene both strands of the non-self-undermining constraint (Pust 2001). According to [P1], S's non-introspective belief that p is justified only if the proposition believed plays a role in the best explanation of S's mental states. No demonstration of explanatory relevance is involved in the two methods of justifying [P1] just discussed. Rather, each approach would take the mere fact that the principle is the content of an intuition or best explains the content of a set of particular intuitions (i.e., intuiteds) as sufficient for justified belief in that principle. This is to treat intuiteds as supporting evidence for a principle allowing only intuitings to count as evidence. Moreover, since [P1] states a necessary condition for the justified acceptance of any proposition not about the occurrence of an observation or intuition, acceptance of [P1] itself is justified only if it satisfies the very requirement it articulates. Unfortunately, because [P1] is a normative proposition about when a belief is justified, it is difficult to see how its truth could play any role in the explanation of the occurrence of any of our experiences or intuitions. However, if [P1] does not satisfy [P1], then, if [P1] is true, we cannot be justified in believing [P1].

3.4.2 可靠性是不可能的

The second argument from explanation has its origins in Benacerraf's (1973) epistemological objection to Platonism in mathematics. Benacerraf argued that the best semantic accounts of mathematics (e.g., Platonist ones) were in tension with our best theories of knowledge (e.g., causal ones) and that attempts to bring the truth conditions of mathematical statements into closer epistemic proximity to human subjects were semantically inadequate. Though he claimed to favor “a causal account of knowledge” and such an account is now generally thought mistaken, it should be noted that Benacerraf motivated the causal connection constraint by noting that one may justify the claim that S does not know p by arguing that S

could not have come into possession of the relevant evidence or reasons: that [S's] four-dimensional space-time worm does not make the necessary (causal) contact with the grounds of the truth of the proposition

for S to have adequate evidence (1973, p. 671).

Field (1989) provides a Benacerraf-style epistemic challenge to belief in mathematics (construed in a Platonist fashion), one which he alleges

does not depend on any theory of knowledge in the sense in which the causal theory is a theory of knowledge; that is it does not depend on any assumption about necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. (pp. 232–233)

On his account, the fundamental problem has to do with the impossibility of explaining “the reliability of our beliefs” in the domain in question. More precisely, he alleges that “if it appears impossible to explain” how our beliefs about some entities or our grounds for the beliefs “can so well reflect the facts about them,” then

that tends to undermine the belief in …. (these) entities, despite whatever initial reasons we might have for believing in them. (p. 26, emphasis added)

Though Field's argument has various of our beliefs as it target, it seems to support the following argument against intuition:

The Argument from Inexplicability of Reliability

• [P1] If we have good reason to think that there is no explanation of why our intuitions are reliable, then we are not justified in believing p on the basis of the intuition that p.
• [P2] We have good reason to think that there is no explanation of why our intuitions are reliable.
• [C] We are not justified in believing p on the basis of the intuition that p.

The non-normative premise, [P2], seems to extend to all necessary truths if the explanation of reliability mentioned in [P1] requires any sort of counterfactual sustaining relation between the truth makers of the propositions in question and our psychological states. The failure of explanation here is intimately linked to the intuitive deviance of counterfactuals featuring in their antecedents the negations of necessary propositions. The standard semantics treats them as uniformly and vacuously true and so there is little informative sense to be made of the notion that were some proposition we take to be (necessarily) true to be false we would believe (or intuit) otherwise than we do. As it is implausible that all our beliefs in non-contingent matters are unjustified, this cuts against [P1] if it is taken to require a counterfactual supporting kind of explanation.

If, on the other hand, [P1] requires only that we have reason to think our reliability not utterly mysterious, then, while [P1] is more plausible, the relevant instance of [P2] may be false. It has been suggested that the provision of an explanation of our having the intuitions we do would, in virtue of the impossibility of such propositions as we intuit having different truth values, suffice as an explanation of their reliability. There is no particular reason to think that our intuitions lack explanation while our other mental states have an explanation. That explanation, when conjoined with our prima facie justification for believing the contents of our intuitions (and our being prima facie justified isn't challenged on this construal of the argument) seems to suffice as an explanation of our reliability. Put another way, if our reliability is a necessary accompaniment of having a certain content, then we have no reason to think our reliability is inexplicable. The explanation, in this sense, of our reliability is a straightforward consequence of the necessarily true contents of our intuitions and the psychological explanation for our having those particular intuitions (Pust 2004; Grundmann 2007, p. 84; but see Schechter 2010).

It may also be argued (Pust 2004) that it isn't, as seems assumed by Field's objection, clearly possible for a creature to have intuitions significantly different from our own. Given the more constrained accounts of intuition discussed above, it is not clear that a creature might have intuitions with contents generally contradicting our own. That such a creature is metaphysically possible is itself a modal claim apparently requiring justification by intuition and such intuitions seem to be lacking. This response to the explanationist can be elaborated in the context of a theory of concept possession according to which a necessary condition of the genuine possession of a given concept (of the sort of primary interest in philosophical investigation) is the reliability of one's intuitions regarding hypothetical cases. Such an account is justified by intuitions and so cannot be an independent justification of them. It may, however, still reasonably be thought to be an explanation (though not a causal one) of their (necessary) reliability.

Finally, just as was true with respect to the Argument from Lack of Explanatory Necessity, there remains the concern that any attempt to justify believing [P1] and [P2] will run afoul of the non-self-undermining constraint by relying on intuitions about justification and explanation in order to argue that intuitions do not justify belief.

3.5 对责难的辩护：自我支持与认识循环

There are, broadly speaking, two ways of defending the use of intuitions as evidence. The first possible defense would be an empirical defense of intuitions by arguing against the second premise of the Argument from Lack of Independent Calibration (§3.2). The defense would proceed by providing an inductive argument, based on non-intuitive evidence, that the contents of intuitions (either generally or of some specific sort) are reliable.

The only other apparent possible defense of the thesis that intuitions prima facie justify belief in their content appeals, as does the traditional rationalist, to the fact that there are many particular propositions which one seems justified in believing simply in virtue of their being the content of a rational intuition (Bealer 1998; Bonjour 1998). The strength of the conclusion is, of course, more supported to the extent that such examples are multiplied. And, as noted above, there appear to be many such examples.

This defense may be generalized by claiming that intuition is self-supporting insofar as the general claim that intuitions provide prima facie justification for belief in their contents is itself intuitive. The possibility of such a defense is the result of the same fact that revealed that all of the extant local skeptical arguments run afoul of the non-self-undermining constraint—the fact that intuitions seem to be the only source of justification for claims about justification, reason, evidence and other epistemic concepts.

The obvious concern about this sort of defense (in both its particular and general form) is the fact that it necessarily involves epistemic circularity of some kind. That is, it defends the appeal to intuitions as reasons for belief by appeal to intuitions. It seems clear that epistemically circular defenses are sometimes illegitimate, as when questions about the epistemic probity of appeals to a crystal ball are answered by consulting the ball. However, as indicated above (§3.2), it also appears that some sort of epistemic circularity is inevitable in the attempt to defend our most basic modes of evidence and justification. Exactly when such circularity is epistemically disabling and when, if ever, it is acceptable is a difficult question which cannot be here treated in detail (Alston 1986, 1993; Bergmann 2006; Cohen 2002; Vogel 2008). However, a few remarks are in order.

First, if epistemic circularity is always unacceptable, then it is impossible to defend the appeal to intuition. However, the same result will follow (ultimately) for any putative source of evidence. So, while it will be the case that the use of intuitions as evidence cannot be defended, it will also follow that the reliance on perception, memory and introspection can also not be defended. Universal skepticism would appear to follow. Alternatively, if epistemic circularity is sometimes acceptable, then no reason has been provided why it is not acceptable in the case of rational intuition.

Second, if we focus on the question of whether we are prima facie justified in accepting the contents of our intuitions, there may be a feature which distinguishes intuition from all other putative sources of evidence. Only intuition is clearly capable of epistemic self-support because it is the only source which produces non-doxastic states with epistemically normative content. Whether or not apparent perception that p, introspection that p, or apparent memory that p justify us in believing their content is, it seems, a question they cannot answer as their content is never epistemic. Hence, intuition appears distinguishable from our other putative sources of evidence in being both required for a coherent epistemology and capable of epistemic self-support. So, if any source of evidence can be defended against global skeptical attack, it seems that intuitions can.

Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that the epistemic credentials of intuitions can be defended by appealing to similarities between perceptual justification and intuitive justification or to a general doctrine regarding non-inferential justification. According to perceptual dogmatism, a person having a perceptual experience or a perceptual seeming with propositional content p is thereby prima facie justified in believing p (Pryor 2000). According to intuitive dogmatism, a person having an intuition or intellectual seeming with propositional content p is thereby prima facie justified in believing p. According to general dogmatism, when it seems to a person that p, that person is thereby prima facie justified in believing p. It follows from general dogmatism that intuitions, as characterized by the various versions of the sui generis state view above (§1.3), are a source of justification (Huemer 2005, 2007). Moreover, it seems extremely plausible that if perceptual dogmatism is true, then so is intuitive dogmatism (Chudnoff 2011b; Koksvik 2011).

Whatever the merits of general or perceptual dogmatism, it is important to recognize that appealing to them in defending intuitive dogmatism involves exactly the same sort of epistemic circularity as that involved in the more straightforward defense previously noted. This is because all versions of dogmatism are themselves justified entirely on intuitive grounds—by the fact that they properly accommodate our various intuitions about the conditions under which a person has non-inferential propositional justification. Hence, appeals to dogmatism of any sort are ultimately justified only if intuitions do provide prima facie justification and so cannot serve as an independent defense of the appeal to intuitions. Epistemic circularity in the epistemology of intuition appears unavoidable.

4. 实验哲学和直觉

4.2 实验证据

For experimental philosophers seeking to investigate the sources, character and distribution of intuitions of philosophical interest, the primary method has consisted of asking subjects questions about hypothetical scenarios, or less frequently, about principles or generalizations. The evidence has been responses (whether binary [yes/no] responses or graded [Likert scale] responses) to such survey questions. Those pursuing the sources project and the variation project also aim to determine which factors co-vary with answers—cultural or ethnic group, socio-economic status, region of brain or cognitive processes implicated in answering the question, psychopathology, order of questions, framing of questions, etc.

Of course, traditional first-person armchair methods seek to determine which features of the content of the scenario under consideration vary with one's intuitions. Indeed, this is exactly how one endeavors to test or to make more precise some general thesis in many areas of philosophy. Proponents of the sources project and the variation project however, seek to determine which features of those considering the scenario or of framing or presenting the same question vary with the relevant intuitions.

There have been a variety of worries raised about the adequacy of survey methods as means of gaining access to intuitions of the relevant sort. The strength of these worries vary according to the conception of intuition. If, as claimed by various sui generis state accounts (§1.3), intuitions are not beliefs or mere dispositions to believe, then the inferential route from evidence consisting of survey responses to conclusions about intuitions is considerably lengthened.

First, differences in responses may be produced by different ways of “filling in” a schematic hypothetical case (Sosa 2007). Second, there may be multiple concepts answering to a single word (Sosa 2007). (For some recognition of this fact by experimental philosophers, see the use of the “coin-flipping” case by Weinberg et al. (2001) and Swain et al. (2008) to exclude subjects who use “S knows that p” to mean merely that S has high confidence that p.) These two suggestions do not raise the possibility that that the subjects in such surveys are not responding on the basis of intuitions. Rather, they raise the possibility that the intuitions are not intuitions regarding the same property or about the same case. (See Alexander and Weinberg 2007 for the suggestion that both of these concerns apply equally to non-solipsistic proponents of the traditional armchair methodology.)

A third, more general, worry is that such surveys run a risk of eliciting from subjects responses determined by something other than their intuitions regarding the answer to the survey question—e.g., by implicatures determined by what a sentence is typically used to communicate (Adams and Steadman 2004; Deutch 2009; Bach 2002) and by more general pragmatic factors governing the determination of speaker meaning and task interpretation. These worries may be especially pressing in the odd and ambiguous context of a set of hypothetical and often bizarre cases presented by a philosopher to a philosophically naïve subject unaware of the nature of the discipline (Scholl 2007, p. 580; Cullen 2010; Ludwig 2007). Bengson (forthcoming) argues that it is plausible that survey responses are often not indicative of subjects' intuitions but are instead the product of guesses, hunches or inferences.

Some proponents of survey methods claim that such worries have very low prior probability and should not be taken seriously without experimental confirmation. Those who raise them, however, claim to have significant independent evidence of their general relevance (Cullen 2010; Scholl 2007) or their importance in producing the particular results at issue. Some of these problems seem difficult to control for without engaging subjects in something like philosophical dialogue and dialectic (see Kauppinen 2007)—i.e., by doing philosophy with them—which is thought by many experimental philosophers to be a form of biasing or data contamination.

Nothing precludes experimental philosophers from circumventing such concerns by using experimental paradigms other than the administering of surveys. They may use reaction-time studies from cognitive psychology (Arico et al. 2011), empirical evidence from neuroscience (Allman and Woodward 2008; Greene et. al. 2001), evolutionary biology or other sources. While such sources of evidence are not subject to the difficulties of surveys, they also appear unlikely to produce direct evidence of use to the verification project or the variability project because these projects require responses to the abstract and detailed linguistic descriptions of cases one typically presents in philosophical analysis. Indeed, Scholl (2007) suggests that the most methodologically satisfactory experimental philosophy will be primarily a version of the sources project implicating rather low-level processes immune, in virtue of their modularity, from the interpretive and pragmatic difficulties outlined above.

4.3 实验哲学和怀疑性责难

The sources project is, as noted above, often presented as a possible means of justifying skepticism regarding some class of philosophical intuitions. An analogy suggested by Knobe and Nichols (2008) is to debunking explanations of religious beliefs. Theorists engaged in such projects argue that religious belief (or religious experience on which such belief is based) is produced by some questionable process such as wish fulfillment, desire for a father figure, cultural indoctrination, etc. It is then argued (or assumed) that this fact about the source of the belief (or its direct internal ground) undermines the epistemic credentials of such beliefs.

This may suggest that some skeptical proponents of the sources project aim to motivate an instance of the Argument from Unreliability (§3.3). As an example, consider Greene's fMRI-based arguments (Greene et al. 2001; Greene 2003, 2007) against certain “characteristically deontological” intuitions in ethics. The primary experimental data on which his argument is based is the fact that portions of the brain independently implicated in emotional reaction are more active when subjects consider cases giving rise to characteristically deontological intuitions than when they consider cases giving rise to characteristically consequentialist intuitions. However, critics will allege (§3.3) that attempts to show that a process is unreliable (independent of disagreement) require independent access to the target domain and such intuition-independent access seems lacking for most of the target domains of philosophical inquiry. In this vein, Berker (2009) argues that the best argument in Greene's work rests largely on other intuitions about the general normative insignificance of the factors within hypothetical cases to which Greene believes deontological intuitions are responsive. (See Unger (1996) for an entirely a priori criticism of many “characteristically deontological” intuitions for their apparent responsiveness to intuitively normatively insignificant factors.)

The aforementioned analogy to debunking explanations of religious belief might also be taken to suggest a version of the Argument from Lack of Explanatory Necessity (§3.4.1). According to that argument, the provision of an explanation of the occurrence of the intuitions in question (the intuitings) which does not appeal to the truth of their contents (the intuiteds) undermines belief in their contents. The role of experimental work might be thought to be to support the factual premise of that argument (see Greene 2003, p. 849 for such a suggestion). As we have seen (§3.4.2), critics will claim that the argument relies on a questionable normative premise and violates the non-self-undermining constraint. They may also suggest that the plausibility of the non-normative premise of the argument derives from very general armchair (perhaps even entirely a priori) reflections on the contents of the intuitions, their truth-makers, and the nature of explanation.

Some proponents of the variation project present us empirical evidence of disagreement between intuitions in order to motivate a version of the Argument from Intrasource Inconsistency (§3.3.2). Some critics of skepticism motivated by the variation project claim, contrary to what was suggested earlier (§2.4), that intuitions are not treated as evidence or reasons in philosophical inquiry (Deutsch 2010; Williamson 2007). Whether such a maneuver really evades whatever skeptical implications follow from disagreement depends on whether disagreements of belief are epistemologically less troubling than variations in non-doxastic justifiers.

Though critical of the variation project, Sosa's suggests that

there will definitely be a prima facie problem for the appeal to intuitions in philosophy if surveys show that there is extensive enough disagreement on the subject matter supposedly open to intuitive access. (Sosa 2007)

Relevant to determining whether the antecedent of Sosa's conditional is satisfied are the methodological concerns about survey methods noted above and their ability to support claims of intuition disagreement. Relevant to determining the possibility of the antecedent of Sosa's conditional being satisfied are the distinctively a priori concerns raised above (§3.4.2) about the possible extent of disagreement, about how the existence of widespread disagreement could be justifiably believed to exist (§3.3.2), and, importantly, about the non-self-undermining constraint.

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1. 罗素 1902 年在弗雷格《算术基本规律》一书中发现了所谓的罗素悖论，它表明朴素集合论的两条公理导致矛盾。这两条公理分别是概括公理（Comprehension Axiom）和外延公理（Axiom of Extensionality）。一阶概括公理是说，任何公式都定义一个集合。一阶外延公理是说，两个集合相等当且仅当它们由相同的元素构成。举例来说，依据概括公理，我们定义不属于自身的集合r，根据外延公理，不属于自身的这个集合属于自身当且仅当它不属于自身，产生矛盾。

2. 德·摩根首先发现了在命题逻辑中存在着下面这些关系：非(P且Q)=(非P)或(非Q)，非(P或Q)=(非P)且(非Q)。

3. [拉丁语：关于命题的]“从言”命题和“从物”（de re，拉丁语，关于事物的）命题的区分，由于托马斯·阿奎那的工作而获得流行。从言命题用某些词项对作为一个整体的主谓式命题作出断言，从而形成一个二阶陈述。从物命题则用某些词项对主词作出断言。这一区分有广泛的应用，但在关于模态命题（有关必然性和可能性的命题）的分析中特别重要。从言模态与把“必然地”或“或能的”归属于一命题有关，例如“苏格拉底在跑是可能的。”从物模态与把这些模态术语归属于一主词或对象有关，例如“苏格拉底可能在跑”。从言解释和从物解释对于同一命题将导致不同的真值。随着对模态逻辑和本质主义兴趣的复苏，有关这一区分的争论也再次流行起来。

4. 1905年《论指谓》中,罗素首次提出亲知知识（knowledge by acquaintance）与摹状知识（knowledge by description）的区分,并将亲知界定为“当我们对一个客体具有直接的认知关系时,我们可以说你亲知到了它”。直接性是亲知论题的标志性特征。罗素认为,这种直接的认知关系将排除判断,是构成呈现(presentation)的一部分。罗素打算将亲知刻画为一种基础主义式的知识,这种知识不仅具有直接性,还能够为我们的知识大厦提供基础。

5. 传统知识论认为：知识是得到确证的真信念。葛梯尔难题对这一问题提出了反例。比较著名的就是这一“‘得到职位的人兜里有十个硬币’是一个得到确证的真信念，但知道它”。

6. 沼泽人（swampman）思想实验是1987年美国哲学家唐纳德·戴维森提出的思考实验，常常用于思考“我到底是什么”这一自我认证的命题。某个人出门去散步，在经过一个沼泽边上的时候不幸的被闪电击中而死亡。与此同时在他的旁边正好也有一束闪电击中了沼泽，十分罕见的是这个落雷和沼泽发生了反应，产生了一个与刚才死掉的人无论形体还是质量都完全相同的生物。我们将这个新产生的生物叫做沼泽人。沼泽人在原子级别上与原来那个人的构造完全相同，外观也完全一样，当然大脑的状态（被落雷击中的人死前的大脑状态）也完全被复制了下来，也就是记忆和知识看起来也完全一样。走出沼泽的沼泽人就像刚死去的男人一样边散步边回到了家中，然后打开了刚死去的男人的家门，和刚死去的男人的家人打电话，接着边读刚死去的男人没读完的书边睡去。第二天早上起床后，沼泽人到刚死去的男人的公司上班。

2016-12-14 02:05 experimental-philosophy